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Chairman CHAIRMAN'S  MESSAGE 
An  overview 
Who would have predicted, one century ago 
when the dream of Icarus became a reality; 
the prominence of aviation in our society 
today? 
Every day, more and more people use air 
transport for business, cultural exchanges or 
tourism. More and more goods are carried 
by air. This increasing mobility, which is 
scarcely affected by the present hard eco-
nomic times, runs ahead of economic 
progress. This phenomenon is particularly 
true in the European Union and can only 
widen with the disappearance of national 
borders, the creation of the European Eco-
nomic Area and the development of rela-
tions with the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe. 
Why  the Comite  des  Sages? 
The Comite des Sages was set up to reflect 
on the future of aviation in Europe as an 
essential tool for economic and social devel-
opment. 
Its first finding was that the European airline 
industry is at a crossroad. The causes of this 
situation have been analysed by the Comite 
with only one purpose: to suggest practical 
remedies. 
For six months it has listened to the often 
contradictory views of many knowledgeable 
people. It has contacted organisations, 
studied the many problems facing air trans-
port, analysed data and weighed alterna-
tives. The Comite has reached a broad con-
sensus both on causes and on remedies. (1) 
The  root of  the current  problems 
In its early days as an infant industry, air 
transport depended on state support. It 
developed as a highly protected area of 
national economies, an integral part of 
government policy. All over the world, states 
exercised their right of sovereignty over 
airspace and their privilege to set up na-
tional carriers. Almost regularly, these 
carriers were used by governments as an 
instrument to promote trade, or their "own" 
(I) Two dissellling opinions were expressed: Mes.1·rs SchiHch 
and l'alladon mtthe issue ofgrowul handling services at 
Commw1itv airports and Mr \lalladon on social issues. 
aeronautical industry, or foreign political 
links or domestic employment - all without 
regard to the economic implications or 
commercial significance. 
As a result, national air transport systems 
emerged, causing fragmentation and many 
inefficiencies. In this general trend, Europe 
was no exception. It still suffers from this 
heritage. 
Some argue that basic characteristics of the 
airline industry are unique and therefore 
require their own decision-making rules and 
a distinct regulatory framework. 
In a certain sense this is true. It is clear that, 
from a business point of view, international 
air transport is often subject to less than 
rational commercial decisions. These are 
based on traditions; national pride or simply 
on the fascination of an industry symbolising 
the ability of human beings to overcome 
natural limitations and to realise the dream 
of Icarus. 
Of course, this fascination is primarily an 
asset. It implies an above-average willing-
ness of managers and employees to work 
hard for the well-being of this industry. The 
crux of the problem is to reconcile this asset 
with rules ensuring that economically 
rational decision-making prevails. The 
European air transport industry will have a 
prosperous future only if decision-makers at 
all levels, including public authorities, 
manage to achieve this reconciliation. This 
job has yet to be done. 
Today, technological progress and economic 
developments have profoundly changed the 
market for international air transport. The 
airline business has become a mass produc-
tion industry. It markets its services in real-
time at almost any point on earth. Global 
competitiveness has become the key to 
commercial survival. The need to identify 
and to assess strategic and practical options 
for managing transition from the past to the 
future is obvious. 
At a very early stage of the work it became 
clear to all Members of the Comite that a 
major fact-finding exercise was required. For 
far too long debates had been largely in-spired and conducted by those offering 
simplistic answers to complex problems. 
The Comite was unwilling to accept mis-
leading slogans and catchwords like "jungle 
of ultraliberalism" or "state support for lame 
ducks" which so often were the only avail-
able substitute for a solid and honest analy-
sis. 
Instead, the Comite opted for a careful 
collection and examination of indisputable 
data and facts. Hearings with well-experi-
enced experts and senior managers were 
held and an analysis of all written submis-
sions was made. The results of an external 
and independent study on the cost structure 
of the European airline industry were taken 
into account. The outcome of this whole 
exercise is presented in this report. 
A costly  fragmentation 
Analysis shows that European airlines pay a 
heavy price for the fragmentation of their 
market in Europe. Airports and air traffic 
control systems are ill-adapted to present 
changes, because they are based on national 
and local interests rather than being part of a 
European concept. This practice has so far 
escaped the justifications of cost analysis 
and the competitive drive which would 
naturally result from a liberalised air trans-
port system. 
European airlines and airports also bear the 
cost of their own heritage: their productivity 
is far lower than their competitors' in other 
parts of the world, notably in the US. 
The legal environment in Europe has 
changed. The Community has anticipated 
the coming global challenges by establishing 
the Single Aviation Market and dismantling 
the old national barriers to carrier designa-
tion and market access. But in real life, the 
"level playing field" in this aviation market 
remains somewhat rhetorical. Governments, 
airlines and even Community institutions 
are hesitant. State subsidies, ownership 
control and other competition-distorting 
factors still prevent the system from operat-
ing on even terms. 
The three liberalisation packages for intra-
Community air transport represent major 
steps towards developing the full economic 
potential of the Single Market. However, 
much remains to be done. The key recom-
mendations of this report are directly linked 
to a key finding: the overly-high costs of 
European air carriers require a major drive 
to increase efficiency at all levels. 
The productivity gap of the European airline 
industry is based on various elements. Some 
of them are controllable by an airline's 
management. Others go beyond such direct 
control. They may nevertheless have a 
significant impact on the costs of an indi-
vidual airline. Air traffic control and airport 
charges are examples of specific problems in 
Europe. 
Above all, however, the Single Aviation 
Market exists so far only in law. In concrete 
economic terms, the structure of the Euro-
pean airline industry is still very much 
oriented towards outdated national bounda-
ries. For the European industry to survive as 
a global competitor, Europe's Single Aviation 
Market must be transformed urgently into 
economic and aeropolitical reality. 
What is  needed 
In the view of the Comite des Sages, here is 
what must happen: 
- The internal market must be made to 
work by enforcing its rules and 
effectively addressing sensitive issues 
like slots, state aids, mergers and 
alliances. 
- As a matter of utmost urgency, 
infrastructure bottlenecks must be 
removed. New provisions of the 
Maastricht Treaty should be activated 
to provide Community funds needed 
for establishing an efficient Single Air 
Traffic Management System and a 
truly European airport network. 
- Future efforts to harmonise national 
regulations must be linked to a clearly 
demonstrated cost-saving effect. 
- Innovative forms of financing 
investments must be facilitated by 
updated rules on taxation and 
ownership in order to help air carriers 
overcome their current financial 
impasse. 
- A genuine Community approach to 
external aviation relations must be 
quickly established because this is 
vital for realising the economic 
potential of the Single Aviation 
Market and for the mutual interest of 
Europe and its partners in the world. A fair  balance of interests 
In addition to reaping the full potential 
benefits of the Single European Aviation 
Market, another important condition must 
be met. It is essential to ensure the right 
balance of interests between the airline 
industry and other related areas like airport 
services, environmental concerns and the 
justified interest of the workforce in not 
shouldering, alone, the entire burden of the 
restructuring process. 
The Comite analysed all these areas with a 
view to defining a fair balance of interests. 
This has been, of course, a difficult under-
taking because it means identifying the 
borderline between. objective requirements 
and subjective interests. Obviously, conflicts 
of interest are difficult to avoid when times 
are changing. This may explain why the 
relevant section of this report (1) contains 
two dissenting opinions. However, there 
was broad consensus that 
- airport managements should 
contribute to improving efficiency and 
should, therefore, open ground 
handling services to competition; 
- further improvements in managing the 
environment are required. These 
improvements should be based on a 
careful analysis of cost-effectiveness in 
order not to put additional burdens 
solely on the European air transport 
industry as compared to its 
competitors; 
- adaptation of employees should be 
facilitated by flexibility and mobility-
increasing measures. In this context 
the possibility of Community financial 
support should be examined; 
- public authorities should use identical 
cost imputation principles for 
financing investments in different 
transport modes and should support 
improvements of complementarity 
between these different modes; 
- governments and public authorities 
should abstain from intervening for 
noncommercial reasons in the 
operations of air carriers. 
Close to the end of the work of the Comite 
des Sages, the European Commission's 
White Paper on Competitiveness, Growth 
and Employment, of December 1993 became 
available and was endorsed by the European 
Summit. 
(I) See "Ensuring the Right Balance". 
We found that the thrust of this document 
perfectly fits in with the main emphasis of 
our report. Both documents attach priority 
to making the Single Market fully effective 
and both emphasise the need for infrastruc-
ture improvements as the most promising 
way to create new jobs. 
The Comite is convinced that extra efforts to 
improve air transport infrastructure will 
immediately generate a high return to the 
European economy as a whole. There is no 
reason to further delay urgently needed 
projects. 
A change  of  mentality 
After six months of listening to people, 
analysing problems and assessing ·alterna-
tives, the main lesson I have drawn from this 
exercise is that old habits obviously die 
hard. Mentality changes are lagging behind 
technological, economic and regulatory 
changes. 
Decision-makers in many air carriers, 
national governments, unions, financial 
institutions, airport managements and in EU 
institutions need to speed up their adapta-
tion to the new challenges of a more and 
more global and competitive business 
environment. 
The European air transport industry cannot 
afford a continuing lack of such mentality 
changes. Recognition of this very basic truth 
is THE key to entering better times for the 
industry, its employees and air transport 
users. 
This change of mentality is, therefore, much 
more important than the accumulated 
wisdom of any Committee. 
Herman De Croo 
Chairman THE  ECONOMICS  OF  AIR  TRANSPORT 
A growth  industry 
plagued  by  poor 
profitability 
General 
The availability of a high quality air trans-
port system inside Europe and to and from 
Europe is an essential prerequisite for 
overall economic growth. Dynamic develop-
ment of trade in general and tourism in 
particular heavily depends on possibilities to 
organise face-to-face business contacts and 
to travel efficiently to regions where other 
transport modes cannot provide an efficient 
alternative. Similarly, cost-efficient cargo 
transportation is essential for promoting 
trade, creating new markets and improving 
the productivity of manufacturing indus-
tries. 
The direct impact of air transport on the 
general economy is clear: 
- In industrialised countries, these services 
account for about 1% of GDP. 
- In Europe, airlines employ about 400,000 
people. 
However, the indirect impact of air transport 
is less understood. Consider these facts: 
-European airports (as distinct from air-
lines) employ about 500,000 people. 
- For each person employed at an airport, 
there are two other jobs created in the 
catchment area. This means that one 
million people are employed in the catch-
ment areas around European airports, 
solely because of the air transport industry. 
-The aeronautical industry itself employs 
400,000 people in Europe. Most of these 
workers are highly-skilled, using state-of-
the-art technology that generates a higher-
than-average contribution to the overall 
economy. 
-The spill-over effect of the aircraft industry 
to other industries is substantial. 
-Other related industries, such as tourism 
and shipping, are largely dependent on the 
air transport industry. 
A report published in 1993 by the World 
Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC) esti-
mated that travel and related activities 
presently directly and indirectly account 
worldwide for more than 10% of world GDP, 
about 10.7% of world capital investment, 
and 10.9% of consumer spending. 
Overall, it is estimated that some 10 million 
jobs in the European Community alone are 
related to the availibility of an efficient air 
transport system. 
Such is the present power of the European 
air transport industry. But what of the 
future? This role will be even greater, be-
cause so many other growth industries in 
the next century will depend heavily on 
transport and telecommunications. 
The  importance  of  location  in  the 
air  transport  business 
A priori, the essential economic role that air 
transport must fulfill stems from the 
availibility of a network system and not 
necessarily from the homebase location of 
the airlines providing such services. From a 
user's point of view, it does not matter 
whether European, American or Asian air 
carriers provide the quantity and quality of 
the transportation required for economic 
growth in other industries. However, for a 
number of reasons, the homebase location of 
the airlines is highly important for the 
positive spill-over effects they have on the 
European economy as a whole. 
Air transport serves the public in many 
ways. The quality of this service depends-
to a large extent- on where the focussing 
points (hubs) of an airline's network are 
located. There is a natural correlation be-
tween the number of hubs and the homebase 
location of an airline. This makes it likely 
that the quality of Europe's air transport 
system would suffer if non-European air-
lines were the only significant service pro-
viders in Europe. 
In addition, it is clear that an individual 
airline management's ability to identify 
market opportunities depends very largely 
on geographical proximity to the market in 
question. 
Moreover, it is a simple fact of life that the 
aircraft manufacturing industry cannot 
develop its business without a solid cus-
tomer base "at home". American aviation history (and other exam-
ples) illustrate the close link between the 
presence of a high-volume air transport 
industry and the potential for running an 
efficient and competitive aerospace industry. 
For European manufacturers, the presence of 
a European customer base is equally essen-
tial to stay in business, develop, and keep 
Europe at the forefront of technological 
development. 
Therefore, a genuine European Air Transport 
Industry is a key industry for the overall 
economic welfare of Europe. The pace-
making function of air transport for general 
economic growth and the quality of its 
service depend to a large extent on the 
homebase location of the airline. 
In view of this, creating stable conditions for 
the economic and financial well-being of the 
European airline industry is essential for 
building Europe's sustainable competitive 
advantage in the global air transport market. 
Therefore, this must be a prime concern for 
European economic policy. 
Overall  economic  development: 
strong growth and  poor 
profitability 
In an historical perspective international air 
transport has undergone dynamic develop-
ments. 
During the 1980s world air transport in-
creased by an average of 6% p.a. in volume 
terms and by 4.0% p.a. in real monetary 
terms. Such average growth rates are above 
rates of growth in GDP and indicate that 
international air transportation is, in addi-
tion to its importance for overall growth, 
already in itself a growth industry. 
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Air  Cargo 
Developments for air cargo show equally 
favourable trends: 
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Graph 2:  Growth in air cargo worldwide 
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Air freight and express services are an important 
sector of the air transport system. The character-
istics of this sector call for specific attention in 
Europe.  Therefore, liberalising rules have been 
enacted in the Community alongside rules for 
passenger services. There is room for further 
facilitating the free movement of goods  by air 
within the Single Market, in  particular as 
regards clearances at airports. This report 
contains a recommendation  regarding air/rail 
cooperation.(]) The development of air cargo fits 
in a Community policy on Trans  European 
Networks. 
A market relating to  carriage of mail, documents 
and parcels has developed alongside the cargo 
services in response to market needs. Interna-
tional operators, called  "integrators" essentially 
combine air and road transportation. With a fleet 
of over 1,200 aircraft they now represent an 
important sector of the evolving cargo market. 
Trends for the European airline industry 
have shown similar development patterns if 
all modes (scheduled, non-scheduled) are 
considered. However, it is noticeable that 
carriers in the Association of European 
Airlines (AEA) have encountered a below-
average growth in monetary terms. In other 
words: so-called European flag carriers are 
losing market share. 
(  1) See "Linking Modes of1/'ansport" 250 
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. AEA  REVENUE 
. EC  GDP 
. AEA  RPK 
OL_  ____________________________  ___ 
1982 19831984 1985 19861987 1988198919901991  1992 
1982=100 
Source:  AEA - European Conunission 
In this context it is significant that independ-
ent air carriers in Europe (notably charters) 
have experienced much stronger growth. 
This indicates their ability to seize market 
opportunities in a liberal regulatory environ-
ment. 
Graph 4:  Growth of  independenr carriers in Europe (ACE) 
(notably charters) 
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Charters 
The non-scheduled air services have developed 
considerably in Europe over the years and played 
an important role in the promotion of travel and 
tourism, with one out of two air passengers in 
Europe traveling on charter flights. 
Under the new rules on market access, the 
distinction between scheduled and non-scheduled 
services has somewhat blurred as the flexibility 
has increased : independent carriers may choose 
to operate scheduled as well as non-scheduled 
services between Community airports.  The 
traditionally distinct markets are now often 
overlapping, which offers new opportunities for 
growth. 
The average profitability of air carriers 
differs significantly from profitability in 
other industries. However, the air carriers' 
favourable overall output/  demand rate has 
never produced an above-average profit 
margin since 1982. Instead, airline profitabil-
ity has always been extremely poor, if 
compared with other key industries. Since 
1990, the airline industry has suffered 
specially high losses. 
Table 1: 
Net profit margin of world airline 
industry 
Year  ~argin 
1982  -1.4 
1983  -0.7 
1984  1.9 
1985  1.9 
1986  1.2 
1987  1.7 
1988  3.0 
1989  1.9 
1990  -2.2 
1991  -1.8 
Source: ICAO 
With the exception of air carriers specialised 
in leisure travel, Europe is no exception to 
the rule that scheduled air transport has 
generated poor profits. 
Table 2: 
Average profitability rates in Europe 
1989  1990  1991  1992 
Chemicals  5.29  3.90  2.70  1.50 
~etallurgy  3.59  2.52  0.58  -0.33 
Car  6.42  2.27  2.15  0.98 
Telecom  7.33  7.15  5.65  3.42 
Air Transport I  (AEA)  1.9  -1.88  -1.15  -3.11 
Air Transport II (ACE!  4.62  3.24  3.63  3.99 
Source: AEA -ACE 
European Commission (Panorama de 1'/nduslrie Communautaire) Labour productivity of the European airline 
industry (AEA members) is below average, 
if compared with other key industries. 
Graph 5: Turnover per employee 
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The comparison between annual percentage 
change of GOP and operating revenue of 
European scheduled airlines reflects the 
close relationship worldwide between GNP-
growth and growth in the airline business 
and, thereby, the cyclical nature of both. 
Graph 6:  World RPK versus world economic growth 
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Direct employment in the airline industry 
grew by only 1.9% during the 10-year period 
Table 3:  Employees of European 
Airlines (Thousands) 
Change in % 
1990  1991  1992  92/90 
Scheduled  345  341  332  -3.8% 
AEA 
Charters 
ACE 
23  25  25  +10.3% 
Source: AEA- ACE- European Commission 
1982-1992. lATA member airlines now 
employ a total of 1,490,000 people. Total 
employment staff of AEA members pres-
ently stands at 332,000. lATA and AEA 
members have reduced staff numbers by 
approximately 3.5% during the most recent 
economic downturn. However, it appears 
that independent European carriers (non-
AEA) have increased overall employment 
even despite the downturn. (See table 3) 
Until 1990 capacity and demand followed 
very similar patterns. Market disruptions 
caused by the Gulf War and economic 
recession in many parts of the world have 
produced an imbalance between capacity 
and demand. 
Graph 7: Lvad factors 
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European  imbalances: 
high  costs 
in  a competitive 
environment 
Overall operating costs 
1 9 9  2 
The weakening financial position of the 
airline industry is a global phenomenon and 
the European airline industry is no excep-
tion. However, European airlines lag far 
behind their competitors in adapting their 
cost structures to prevailing market condi-
tions. Thus European air carriers suffer from 
specific handicaps in the global market. 
Europe will need to address these handicaps 
to create conditions for a sustainable and 
competitive European airline industry. 
In 1992, overall operating costs of major 
European airlines (AEA) measured by 
operating costs per ATK, were about 48% 
higher than the operating costs of major US . 
airlines as illustrated by Graph 8. Graph 8: 
Operating costs in US cems per Available Tonne Kilometres 1992 
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Profitability and financial costs 
Economic recession, high operating costs 
and high financial costs (resulting from high 
interest rates and eroding debt/  equity 
ratios) caused European airlines to lose 2.0 
billion US dollars in 1992 (see graph 9). 
Losses incurred since 1990 mean that cash-
flow generated by European air carriers is 
becoming increasingly inadequate for 
financing future investments from own 
resources (see graph 10). Unless profits are 
restored and significantly improved, the 
debt/ equity ratio may reach a level of 80/20 
in 1995. This would undermine the airline 
industry's ability to finance investments 
through traditional financial instruments 
(see graph 11). 
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Graph 9:  European airlines'1992 net  results 
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Although such a financial impasse is not 
unique to the European airline industry, a 
number of specific problems cause European 
carriers to suffer more than other airlines, in 
particular US carriers: 
- A lack of financial instruments comparable 
to those provided by Chapter 11  in the US 
bankruptcy law. 
- Less favourable terms for purchasing 
equipment (less favourable tax-lease 
treatment). 
- Exchange rate risks. 
- Limited access to US dollar market as a 
by-product of national effective control 
requirements. 
Graph 10: Eight largest European airlines' investment 
financing: cash flow and new debt 
Source:  Credit Lyonnais Graph 11: Eight largest European airlines' capitalisation: 
equity and total debt 
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Labour costs 
There is a widespread belief tha:t high salary 
levels and high social costs in Europe repre-
sent a major impediment to better cost 
efficiency. However, the weakness of the 
European airline industry in the area of 
labour costs stems overwhelmingly from 
low labour productivity rather than from 
higher salary and social costs. 
a) Airline salaries versus average national 
average salaries 
A comparison of salaries in the aviation 
industry with salaries in the economy as a 
whole shows in graph 12 that air carriers 
pay- on average- higher salaries than other 
sectors. It should be emphasised that this is 
also valid for the highly-deregulated US air 
transport market, where labour costs have 
risen faster than revenue developments (see 
graph 12). 
Table 4: Analysis of European versus US labour costs and 
productivity 1992 
US- European Percentage 
airline  airlme  difference 
industry  industry 
Financial Measurements (US$) 
Gross salaries per employee  40,534 
Social charges per employee  11,722 
Total labour costs  52,256 
per employee 
Total labour costs per ATK 
Social costs as percentage 
of total 
Physical productivity 
ATKs per employee 
Departures per employee 
Block hours per employee 
* US cents 
Source: Avmark 
15.55* 
22.43% 
336,019 
13.24 
27.15 
44,493 
10,573 
55,066 
21.27* 
19.20% 
258,908 
6.28 
12.98 
10.26% 
-9.80% 
5.38% 
36.76% 
-14.40% 
-22.95% 
-52.57% 
-52.19% 
Graph 12: Average airline salaries versus average national 
levels - 1992 
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b) Salaries and social costs: 
US versus Europe 
On average, total labour costs (salary plus 
social charges) of European airlines 
amounted to US$ 55,066 per employee in 
1992. The corresponding amount for the US 
airline industry was US$ 52,256. In other 
words, the US/European comparison of 
salaries and social costs does not indicate 
significant differences beyond the margin of 
"normal" currency fluctuations. 
c) Labour productivity 
Both the European and the US aviation 
industries pay higher-than-average salaries, 
and there is no substantial difference be-
tween US and European salary levels. The 
real difference between the two continents is 
in labour productivity. 
Table 4 indicates that European labour costs 
per employee are 5.38% higher than in the 
US, but due to much lower labour produc-
tivity in Europe the total labour costs in 
Europe per available tonne kilometre (ATK) 
are nearly 37% higher. 
User charges 
Over recent years the airline industry world-
wide has experienced a significant increase 
in costs beyond management control, nota-
bly landing charges and en route charges. 
Table 5 indicates that for lATA carriers cost 
increases in areas beyond airline manage-
ment control have been considerably higher 
than average cost increases. Europe is no 
exception to this rule. 
Moreover the European region suffers from 
extraordinarily high user charges. ' 
I 
~ 
Table 5: 
International scheduled services 1987-92 
Unit costs 1987-92 in current$ 
US$  US$ 
ATK  ATK  Percent 
1987  1992  Change 
Flight Deck Crew  2.8  3.4  +21.4 
Fuel & Oil  5.6  5.3  -5.3 
Flight Eq. Deprs  3.9  5.2  +33.3 
Ins/ Rental 
Maintenance  4.3  4.7  +9.3 
Overhaul 
Landing Charges  1.7  2.2  +29.4 
En Route Charges  0.9  1.6  +77.8 
Station &  Ground  0.9  1.6  +12.3 
Cabin Attendants  5.0  6.1  +22.0 
Pass.S'vce 
Ticketing  8.2  9.0  +9.8 
Sales/ Promotion 
General &  Admin.  2.5  2.8  +12.0 
Total  39.8  45.8  +15.1 
Source: lATA 
Airport charges for scheduled European 
airlines represent 4 to 6% of the operating 
costs, compared with less than 2% in the 
United States. This relative difference has 
even more impact on ATC-charges where no 
en-route charge exists for domestic US 
traffic. 
Graph 13: 1993 Representative airport charges in US 
domestic and intra-European international operations 
(for Boeing 737-300 aircraft)  Source: Avmark 
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Table 6: 1992 en route 
navigation charges per ATK 
European short hauls 
Euro-majors 
Asian carriers 
US majors 
US domestic carriers 
Source: Avmark 
5  cents 
2.4 cents 
1  cent 
0.2 cents 
0 
Table 7: 
Trends in representative airport and security charges 
paid by airlines at European, US and Asian airports. 
1988-1993 average annual charge (%) in: 
737-300  747-400  Average of the 
charges*  charges *  two aircraft 
types 
Lisbon  +13.3  +12.9  +13.1 (+16.0) 
Rome/Milan  +7.6  +9.6  +8.6 
Frankfurt  +9.2  +5.3  +7.2 
Vienna  +6.5  +5.0  +5.7 
London (LHR)  +5.9  +4.5  +5.2 
Madrid  +4.4  +5.4  +4.9 
Paris (CDG/ORY)  +4.0  +4.7  +4.4 
Copenhagen  +3.6  +2.8  +3.2 
Amsterdam  +2.2  +2.8  +2.5 (+5.6) 
Zurich  +1.2  +1.6  +1.4 
London (LGW)  +2.9  -0.8  +1.1 
Dublin  0  0  0 
European average  +5.0  +4.3  +4.6 (+5.2) 
Los Angeles (LAX)  +35.4  +42.7  +39.1  (+24.3) 
New York (JFK)  +16.3  +9.4  +12.8 (+12.1) 
Chicago CORD)  +7.2  +11 .7  +9.5 (+8.1) 
Houston (IAH)  +0.9  +8.8  +4.8 (+4.1) 
Dallas/Fort Worth  +4.2  +2.3  +3.3 (+4.2) 
Miami  -2.8  -2.6  -2.7 (+0.2) 
Atlanta  +3.0  -8.9  -2.9 (+1.0) 
US Average 
(excl. LAX)  +6.1  +4.2  +5.2 (+5.7) 
Hong Kong  +14.6 
Sydney  +14.0 
Singapore  +0.7 
Bangkok  0 
Tokyo  0 
Asian average  +3.2 
* Only what airlines pay. The figures in parentheses show change when all 
ticket taxes and-passenger charges paid by passengers are included. 
Source: lATA airport and en route aviation charges manual- Avmark. 
With regard to airport charges, US domestic 
flights do not require expensive border 
control procedures. Many US carriers own 
terminal buildings so that they incur airport 
costs themselves and pay less fees. In addi-
tion US airlines have much control over 
airport investments and charging policies. """'· 
(  16 
Recent trends in airport charges are an 
additional problem for the airline industry. 
At certain airports, increases in charges 
(including security charges) have been 
clearly above the overall inflation rate (see 
table 7), thus hampering the efforts of 
airlines' management to improve internal 
cost-effectiveness. 
Graph 14: Comparison of  airpon charges (Boeing 737-300) 
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Part of the differential in air navigation 
charges is due to differences in financing air 
navigation services. In Europe governments 
recover air traffic control costs either 
through the aircraft landing fee or through a 
separate fee. In the US, the passenger bears 
the burden for air navigation services 
through the 10% ticket tax imposed on air 
travel within North America_ 
However, even inclusion of the ticket tax 
would not take away the significant cost 
advantage that the US industry enjoys in this 
area. 
Levels of air navigation charges have rein-
forced the US/Europe differentials in total 
user charges. 
Over the past five years the unit rates 
charged by some Eurocontrol countries have 
soared by double figure percentages 
annually.The average increases since 1988 
have been as follows: 
Table 8:  Average annual increase 
en route navigation charges since 1988 
(local currencies) 
UK  +14.5% 
Italy 
Germany 
Spain 
Portugal 
France 
Denmark 
Netherlands 
Switzerland 
Source:  Avmark 
+14.1% 
+10.5% 
+6.6% 
+6.0% 
+6.0% 
+5.3% 
+2.0% 
+2.0% 
Fuel Costs 
The European airline industry suffers from 
15% higher fuel costs compared to the US 
industry. In 1991/92, European airlines's fuel 
price per gallon was 10 US cents higher than 
the US. Three to four cents of this total are 
attributable to differences in distribution 
costs, a different market structure, a rela-
tively weaker negotiating power, and per-
haps contracting and hedging skills. Fuel 
handling charges at European airports 
account for another one to two cents. Differ-
ences in airline networks (related to certain 
parts of Europe and Africa) add another cent 
while basic oil market differences account 
for four cents a gallon. 
Yield development 
The impact of poor cost-efficiency of the 
European airline industry has been addition-
ally accentuated by declining yields. Overca-
pacity created by overly optimistic forecasts, 
plus market disruptions caused by the Gulf 
war and worldwide economic recession, 
have put downward pressure on the average 
level of air fares and rates, and has reduced 
operating margins. 
Table 9: Real yield developments 
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992 
US cents!ATK 
lATA  65.6  63.2 
AEA  88.2  83.4 
Source:JATA -AEA 
Conclusions 
62.8 
87.7 
61.6 
88.8 
60.1 
83.4 
The current economic and financial impasse 
of the European airline industry results from 
both the impact of recession and the indus-
try's own major structural problems. In 
other words, serious problems will remain 
once current overcapacity is eliminated by 
future growth of air traffic. 
Above all, a major cut in costs is urgently 
required. This cut must cover more than just 
management-controlled costs. Costs beyond 
direct airline management control (notably 
user charges) are extraordinarily high in 
Europe. This puts European carriers at a 
competitive disadvantage in the face of 
global competition. 
Only significant restructuring efforts will 
allow European air carriers to restore sus-
tainable profitability and thus break through 
the present impasse. RESTRUCTURING  FOR  PROFITABLE 
Making the internal market work 
Background 
The Third Package measures and related 
competition, CRS and slot-rules have estab-
lished legal conditions for gradually trans-
forming the fragmented European air 
transport market place into a single competi-
tive market based on equal treatment for all 
Community air carriers, irrespective of their 
place of establishment, their operating 
patterns and ownership. 
With the establishment of the Single Euro-
pean Aviation Market, the tradition of 12 
Member States with 12 separate flag carriers 
is losing its economic and aeropolitical 
justification. 
The so-called "flag carrier" concept is now 
outdated, mainly because it is incompatible 
with the need to make the European airline 
industry competitive on a global scale. 
The Comite believes that the Single Euro-
pean Aviation Market cannot become an 
economic reality, until all parties involved 
(carriers, employees, government authori-
ties) recognise the crucial need to drop the 
concept of "national carriers" in favour of a 
market-oriented approach to decision-
making. 
No rollback 
There is no way back to the previous era of 
national protectionism. 
The Comite firmly advises against any 
rollback of liberalisation. This would be 
inappropriate and self-defeating. It would 
render the global competitiveness impossi-
ble. 
The Third Package and related competition 
rules provide an adequate framework for 
the development of intra-Community air 
services in a market responsive environ-
ment.  · 
The  EU has gradually moved to liberalise 
regulations on air transport and to achieve a 
single market in  this sector. The  "First Package" 
(December 14 1987) contained measures by the 
Council on fares,  capacity, market access, group 
exemptions and application of competition rules. 
The  "Second Package" (July 27 1990) contained 
more liberal rules in  the same basic areas, leading 
to the  "Third Package" (July 23 1992) which 
fully liberalised tariff setting, capacity, market 
access (with a temporary regime for cabotage) 
and introduced a regulation on operating 
licences. 
Practical effects of the Third Package which 
applies since January 1 1993 have so far been 
moderate because the general economic 
recession has discouraged full use of the 
new opportunities. Instead, airlines' first 
priority has been consolidation since the 
inception of the Third Package. 
Overcapacity in the market dates back to 
decisions taken before the Third Package 
came into force. It is obvious that many 
Community air carriers sharply increased 
capacity during the run-up to the internal 
market. Between 1987 and 1991  the number 
of seats offered on Community routes 
increased by 53%. (Source: Institut du 
Transport Aerien). Obviously, many Com-
munity air carriers have attached priority to 
heavy capacity expansion to prepare for 
European liberalisation instead of address-
ing first the cost problems. 
Despite current economic difficulties, Mem-
ber States have not used the safeguard 
provisions, provided by the Third Package. 
These provisions may be called upon when 
there is a drastic need to do so. 
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Overcapacity 
Background 
- .J 
Present overcapacity of Community air 
carriers was caused primarily by overly 
optimistic traffic expectations a number of 
years ago. Overcapacity was further aggra-
vated by market disruptions due to the Gulf 
crisis, economic recession in many parts of 
the world, as well as by state aids and the 
far-reaching protection offered by US bank-
ruptcy law, the so-called "Chapter 11". 
Occasionally, EC competition rules may have 
prevented air carriers from consulting each 
other to rationalise capacity on routes where 
they were competing. 
Global overcapacity has caused more than 
1,000 aircraft to be withdrawn from service 
worldwide. 
~-~~m~end-;tions·  .  ·  .  · l 
I  ·-,iJ~e task of~d~hling with overcapacity 
I 
must be left to airlines, working on a  I 
c<;>mmercial basis. This is not a task for  ! 
! government authorities.·  .  :.  ,  j 
I.- ·Interf~rence'ih  .opehitioll'; ofindividual  .. 
I  aitlines by government mithorities- I  ! apart from public service provisions · 
1 
t tmder the Third Package- is not in.line 
1  :i~~;~::~!~r~~·i1:!~z:.·t~c~i7tt;:t-·  · I 
1  ference should not be allowed.  .  .  / 
I·  -~f~;:~.~:~~~~~;~;~;~~~;~~~!t~~~~of  II 
the Treaty:s competitiol:l:.tules should 
~ot unduly inhibit airlin~s' effort to 
sqlve their problems by 1neans of . 
..  yc?I~tr.ry agr~e~,ent~;-'/.~;'· ...  ·  C:  ~c~:-;  · 
-A~  ·a policy guideline  'for .the near future, ' 
. the European Commission should not 
object to bilateral agreements betweep  I 
f.  iif.~~Ci~ri~~s  .~~l<}.ti~g  ·~9/flP.,a~i,tY: ir.<':,·, ;:  ... ;  j 
1  Iridivtdual markets ang ·concludeq pnor 
toOctober 30 1995 (i.e. including the 
winter s~ason'1995/1996), provided· 
, tpq.t,;  .  ..  ·.  :'i~ ....  ;..  .., ...  ,c- .·  .  ".:~.· ... 
1 
..  -~'a). these  'agreein.erits~a~e,··yoluntary•and 
l
.  ·  that any partner may withdraw from 
·  them wit.hout penalty;  . . · 
·  ..  :~)th·~re ar~!'no}~gal otpractiql  qb~ta- I 
..  ~'~<:des to'fr~~·a.c:cess·.to:the ina'rket':.:, ..  ··  · l 
r-~--~~--------:-~--·-,-.---:-----~::--"-~r,::-- ........ ..., 
r  concerned by any carrie'£, whether'  dr : i 
l  not a party to such agreement;  I 
1  c)  wh~n  such agre~men.ts  !lr~. reached,  •.  I 
!  they are, onaJ::l irH:tividual'bilsis, duly  . 
·  reported to the European· Commis- ' · j 
sion (and approved with minimum  \ 
bureaucracy). It is recommended  i 
that the EurqpeariCommis'sion  • 
clarify legally just how ahd when ;' 
capacity discussions betWeen air 
carriers can be held, and how long 
th~y  c~n last. ,J"his  ~l~~i{~~~'t~pn·\.  · ·  ..  I 
should be published in the Official ·  · ! 
Journal.  .i 
i 
- The Comite furthermore urges the  .  1 
European Commission to  ca.reft]l~y  .  ·.  · I 
monitor' the impact. of the exis'ting blo'ck · j 
exemption on joint ventures. In due 
.  course, the C~mmission  should present  . 
1 
1  a report evaluati;ng the,, impe<_:~ of  this· ..  >.-.• 1 
I  block exemption on' aidine r~s'ti·ucturi~K '·'I 
!  in Europe.  .  · .  !  L_____________  . .  _____  j 
Market access 
Background 
Experience has occasionally shown that 
current legal and aeropolitical uncertainties 
badly disrupt airline planning in relation to 
access to intra-Community routes. These 
uncertainties exist despite a Council Regula-
tion on this subject which contains an entitle-
ment of Community air carriers in this 
respect. 
Market access rules are not always receiving 
sufficient, consistent or swift enough imple-
mentation from the national civil aviation 
authorities concerned. In particular, the 
implementation of certain market access 
rules that are hedged by safeguard clauses, 
such as those pertaining to cabotage or 
exclusive concessions, is often hampered by 
a reluctance of national authorities to act 
quickly, and by slow enforcement at Com-
munity leveL This makes corporate planning 
very difficult and delays quick response to 
market developments. I 
Gi~
1-~~~~~~~t~Ti~lf~n:i~iofl~J~:~~;~~~~ 
entitlement to enter a markets}lould, b~: . '! 
taken by Merqber States'·authorities .  ,  · ! 
within a mci~um  perio#.  o.f::15  day~  ...  ·  .·. j 
f~S~f~g~ard,~  f<:!!lt~.~g •  t_¢.  ~~p,o{~~~- ~r  ,:,  ...  ··:  ·,  :,.:).i:~~ 
~·  ~xclustve col}cesstOf1S should. lie applied':,"/' 
H) a way which is transparent '(md non/  ;:;• 
discriminatory, not only in legal terms,  :  .. 
but also in its practical effects  .. :  .  ... , 
·----'---'-·:..,.·  ~"'  ::..:...; 
Tariffs 
Background 
Community air carriers are basically free to 
set fares and rates, as stipulated by the Third 
Package provisions. 
Such_ freedom is a precondition for ensuring 
the nght framework for market-oriented 
commercial decisions by airlines. 
!herefor~, Member States' and Community 
mtervenhons are, a priori, unhelpful. The 
addition of essentially bureaucratic con-
straints should be avoided. It would be 
counterproductive in today's economic 
climate. In this context, it should be stressed 
that Third Package safeguards on fares and 
rates are, as a rule, applied on the initiative 
of Member States before the European 
Commission becomes involved. So far,  this 
right has not been exercised by Member 
States.  · 
Usually, in a competitive market, carriers 
with the lowest costs set the prices. Conse-
quently, Community air carriers will need to 
change from "cost driven pricing" to "price 
driven costing". This is a painful but neces-
sary process which should not be delayed or 
avoided by systematic use of safeguard 
clauses. 
In specific situations yields may even fall 
below the cost level of all operators, even the 
most efficient. Because of certain economic 
features of air transport, such as high capital 
costs -which drives the need for high utilisa-
tion, and the perishable nature of the prod-
uct, airlines are inclined in a competitive 
market to sell this product below cost. 
Economic recession and overcapacity exacer-
bate this tendency.  · 
The continuing operation of bankrupt 
carriers, made possible by state aids or 
bankruptcy law, may yet worsen the situa-
tion. 
Against this background, the exceptional use 
of the safeguard against "downward spirals" 
in prices must remain possible. 
Given the overall economic environment on 
the one hand, and the benefits to the con-
sumer of interlining on the other hand, the 
air transport industry should have an 
instrument for consultation on fares and 
rates within the framework of EC competi-
tion rules. This applies to both the EC block 
exemption and the US antitrust immunity. 
The borderline between nonbinding tariff 
consultations and a price cartel is a sensitive 
issue which requires well-balanced action 
from competition authorities. This is particu-
larly true during difficult times when the 
pressure to improve revenues may mean 
that consultation on fares and rates have a 
greater impact on the market, even without 
binding arrangements. The application of 
the block exemption on air fares and rates 
should take these facts into account. This 
will ensure that financial strains in the 
airline industry do not mean, in practice, 
that competition rules are applied in a more 
stringent way. 
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\  - Mem]JerSt~tes anci:the Europeart'' .. · ..  ·.· 
J  Com.~is~ion should;':as a rule, abstain 
1  •.  f~o~)!lt,erve.ntienrin  :~{le pricing policy' 
I';  of· airjarr!ers: The:x;·sl).ould act o.nly in_, 
I · ·extreiT1~ ~ases·. ·  ... ·  ·  . :  :· .. · · .. · 
"·Where 1t 1s, demonstrably. required by 
the ~everity of the situation, the appli· . 
cat~on' of ~afeguards:slwul!f be <;:arried ··: 
outJ~.'\~i#'tp~~,·llO~~mt~aucratis :Way;  .: • 
..:·  In~pt:esen.t diffkul(ecoriomic circufil~.  ··  · 
: .· stancei{the'neeci fcirihcreased·rev~:;;: 
.  enue$ should be  recdgnised. 
.  ~ The -EU.ropeari Commission should 
·  ..  :.  ·~pplythe.group'·ext:;mption (:m fa"res · 
'  ,:::f~~f~J~$}f.li  ~;~l~x~~;,~;man.l}.er; t.akil}g 
. ll,i.to' account the'  overall economic •... 
..  situ~tion.~rid.its implitations  ·for:·.':: 
· pridp:g ciecisions, as well as the n~ed 
.to achieve a s:ol).stimer-driven market.  I 
'  .  ..On: thf,North Atlantic,Memb.er- States,  · 
·::.)11~g,lj~;qpean.C6fhi;nissi0h and  us-~ ·• ;  ·  :!
1  .. ·  anHtru~t authorities. should work  . . .  . .  ; 
towards ensuring the continu~tion of  a·· ·I 
flexible application ()f antitrust immu- ! 
.nity:fo~ TAT  A tariff  ·consultatio~s.  1 
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Background 
Airlines occasionally resort to 
anticompetitive practices of various kinds. 
Price dumping, unfair marketing devices, 
rescheduling that targets individual com-
petitors, slot manipulation and other prac-
tices which deprive airlines of normal access 
to the market clearly distort competition. 
They should be banned, especially when 
they constitute an abuse of a dominant 
position  .. 
i  Rec~mmend-~tl~n  l 
1·  As a rule, competition autho,rities should  I 
!·  )nove qui9kly  .• ·tq  enfor~e rules against  , i 
ft:p~~dat'OJ:y  pia'2tk~s<:brother  _ptC}cti~es  · ·  '] 
I having similar effects. Authorities ·  i 
I· should give immediate attention to  ' 
l·  complaints aJ1d make decisions 
l·'  pro111ptly. To this  e~d, interim measures 
K:·snould'be tikenJ::•y'hep. ~eeded  to_ hvoid ·  ·  ·!' 
!:· lasting damage to c:atriers targeted. by  .  ':l 
Lthese praCtices.  _____j 
Frequent  Flyer  Programmes  (FFPs) 
Background 
The purpose of Frequent Flyer Programmes 
is to retain a passenger's loyalty. 
FFPs have recently acquired added value, in 
marketing terms, by linkage to strategically 
important computer reservations systems 
and customer databases. 
Despite their costs, which are higher the 
smaller the carriers, FFPs appear to be 
viewed by most scheduled service carriers 
as essential to remain competitive. 
The EC Commission clearly recognises both 
the competitive pros and cons of FFPs and 
has them under review. 
.  .  ,_, ... :--::-- .. -.  - .• --;·:--:;  .. •  ..  ~:o  .. -·-;;-· ·---,--,..--~,  ..... -.:·--.,..) 
Recommt:!rid(lhon ··  ._  .··  ·· ··  ' .  .  · .. ·  ·  '  i 
The Europea'n Comml.ssion in monitor- ' 
ing the evolution of FFPs, in particular 
: .the effects of FFPs on the functioning of  i 
[\the Singl¢ Eurppean)vfarkej~ spould  .  :,l 
r:.  keep ill  mind:th~ir  vah.ie ·a's a global  .  .. . .  . 
~-·  competitive'to6l'and should avoid action 
·  which limits·the ability of European 
!  ·  airlines to compete  in global markets. 
L~-·  ---~--·  ......  ·~--------·  -~-------------J 
Airport  slot  allocation 
Background 
Priority must be given to providing suffi-
cient airport capacity. This is a condition for 
equal access to airport facilities. 
It is a fact that congestion at some key 
airports has reduced the possibility for new 
entrants to take advantage of new business 
opportunities offered by the Third Package. 
This means that rights which have been 
legally granted are in effect not available, 
thus negating the concept of equal treat-
ment. 
The Code of Conduct approved by the 
Council of Ministers in January 1993 sets out 
common rules aimed at ensuring neutral, 
transparent and nondiscriminatory decisions 
on the allocation of slots at congested air-
ports. The objective is to avoid situations 
where, because of a lack of available slots, 
the benefits of liberalisation are unduly 
denied and competition is distorted. This is 
why the Code of Conduct must be uniformly 
applied throughout the Community. The 
continuation or revision of this Code will be 
decided by July 1 1997, on the basis of a 
proposal to be submitted by the Commission 
no later than January 1 1996. 
The Code of Conduct may help to ease 
problems. However, considering the existing 
and future capacity constraints, there are 
doubts about its full effectiveness in the 
medium and long term. Application of the 
Code should therefore be kept under con-
stant review, with a specific time frame for 
publication of what this constant review is 
finding. 
Obviously, the best solution remains the 
improvement of overall airport capacity. The 
Comite fears that with future growth in air 
travel, the situation at certain Community 
airports will deteriorate further. Slots will 
again become the crucial issue for achieving 
realliberalisation of the market. I 
r··:--;,·~--~-~·-.  ..  .  .  ~-··-.  ·-.  c·-:-··--·-·~· 
I 
mtenm repor,t as soon as_possible:This .'  · 
.  report should say whether. the ,Co.de  ·  .. 
r  has accomplished its ma~h  'aim, that is! 
1  · ·ensure unbiased airport access to ne:w 
'  entrants. The report should highlight 
any failures and. determine how they·· 
can be addressed. Iri that case, solu-· · 
tions sho_uld be proposed as soon as 
possible to the CounCil of Ministers  : 
and the E~ropean  P~1rliainent  .for .quick 
implementation.  ·  · ·  ··.  ··  ·  • 
State aids 
Background 
With the disappearance of traditional forms 
of regulatory protection for national airlines, 
the importance of state aids has increased. 
This development, in conjunction with the 
present financial strains in the airline indus-
try, accounts for the wave of capital injec-
tions and state aid cases submitted for 
approval to the European Commission. 
Capital injections and stale aids have se-
verely contributed to overcapacity and 
uneconomic pricing. 
Significantly, all the cases submitted during 
the last three years have involved carriers 
that are state-owned. This in itself is a 
~otentially significant distortion of competi-
tion between state-owned and privately-
owned airlines. 
Obviously, there is a problem in equitable 
access to public funds. Short of offering all 
airlines an equal discount on navigation 
charges levied by governments through 
Eurocontrol, which is entirely feasible, it 
would be difficult to make any system based 
on public funding truly nondiscriminatory. 
The market-distorting effects of discrimina-
tory state aid are obvious. This is particu-
larly true in a period of economic difficulty 
and overcapacity. State aid delays reduction 
of overcapacity.  . 
In a competitive market, access to finance 
means should be equitable. It should not be 
based on ownership. This principle applies 
both ways: a state which owns an airline 
should neither privilege the carrier against 
privately-owned companies nor disadvan-
tage its carrier by failing to assume the 
responsibilities of a commercially-oriented 
shareholder. 
This principle of equal treatment, irrespec-
tive of ownership, requires a very sophisti-
cated policy on the broader issue of financial 
relations between states and publicly-owned 
carriers. It requires a clear separation be-
tween the normal commercial operations of 
a shareholder and state aids granted under 
Art. 92/93 of the EC Treaty. 
One may argue that the most solid way to 
phase out privileged treatment of state-
owned carriers would be to privatise all air 
carriers. The Comite, on the one hand, 
believes that objective economic require-
ments of an increasingly global market 
implies strong pressure towards privatisa-
tion and that governments should therefore 
work in that direction. This would facilitate 
restructuring considerably. However, the 
Comite understands that privatisation 
normally needs prior restructuring. 
The Comite believes that financial support to 
airlines, whether by governments or other 
authorities, should be banned if it violates 
the rules of the Treaty of Rome by exceeding 
normal commercial conditions. 
For a brief transitional period, however, the 
Comitereluctantly recognises the need for 
some states to act on a genuine "one time, 
last time" opportunity to put airlines on a 
normal commercial footing. The reasons for 
granting exceptions are essentially political. 
The normal role of bankruptcies in the 
restructuring process is likely to encounter 
significant opposition. In particular, airline 
employees should not unduly suffer from 
the consequences of decades of mismanage-
ment and political interference without some 
opportunity to correct matters in their 
interest. 
The foregoing findings also relate to the 
need for restructuring ground handling 
services at Community airports. (1) These 
services have been organised in most Mem-
ber States for a long time in the form of a 
monopoly or similarly restrictive arrange-
ments. Accordingly, a basic need for restruc-
turing exists and may require financial 
backing from public authorities. Therefore, 
the following recommendations also apply 
to this specific business. f·.  incompatible'  0it~'  i{ormal commercial 
1
,;·  -t~:c;~;~~ean  ~ommi~sion·.  i~ ~r~~d·  to 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
l 
l 
.  ·  ~  .strictly enforce Treaty pruv1s10ns  · 
·  : concerhing state aids ~nd to elaborate 
clear guidelines for ~valuating any 
exceptional application of state aid. 
- For a brief period, however, approval 
of state .aids may be considered when 
this aid serves the Community's 
interest in a restructuring that leads to 
competitiveness. In this context, 
support for the transition of an air 
carrier (or airport handling services) to 
commercial viability may be in the 
Community's interest if the position of 
competitors is safeguarded. 
The conditions of such approvals 
should include, though not necessarily 
be limited to, the following: 
a) a clear and genuine "one time, last 
time" condition; 
b) the submission of a restructuring 
plan leading to economic and 
commercial viability within a speci-
fied time frame, proven by access to 
commercial capital markets. The 
plan must attract significant interest 
from the private sector and ulti-
.. mately lead to privatisation; 
i·  c;)  the validity of such a plan and its 
chances of success being assessed by 
..  independent professionals hired by 
I 
··  the European Commission to take 
·  ·.:  p<lrt  i~ th~ Com.inissii:m's assessment 
,  procedure: Results bfthis ass~ss- · 
. ,,  ~ :.  ment.spoulq be. m~qe  public:~l1  ... 
· ....  conjunctioi1w:ltha_11yeventual  ._. 
\ ·  ··  ·.  Comr?.lis~icm  d~eision;  .  ·  . 
l  .  a) the ~ndertaking on the part ofthe 
1  ·government  conc~rned  to r7frain  ·. 
t  froin interfering, financially or  . 
I 
otherwise, in commercial decision 
.  making by the carriers concerned; 
I  e) the prohibition of the airline using 
I 
public money to buy or take over 
1  another air carrier or to extend its 
)  own capacities beyond overall 
1  market development. Instead, 
i  reduction of capacity should be 
j  .  envisaged;  .. 
i  f) acceptable proof that the competitive 
I  ·  interests of other airlines are not 
i  negatively affected; 
I  .  g) careful monitoring, assisted by 
j  . independant professional experts, of 
1  the implementation of such restruc-
l  turing plan. 
Mergers, alliances, 
forms  of  cooperation 
Background 
The concept of the national carrier no longer 
fits into the regulatory pattern of the Third 
Package. 
The global competitive environment calls for 
European airlines to reassess the scope of 
their operations. 
Mergers and cooperation agreements may be 
a useful vehicle, among others, for promot-
ing and accelerating the restructuring 
process and so paving the way to significant 
cost savings. In no case, however, should 
such proposed arrangements be allowed if 
they seek to create a dominant position. 
Recommendations 
- Airlines should be. left free to dedde 
on their ow.n optimum,sizeand operat-
ing means.  ,  ... 
- Recognising the overaJl potential 
advantages of alliances and mergers 
for users and operi\tbrs, and the·. 
(  resulting demise of the:.nationaf:flag  ..• 
'  carrier concept, the Eu:ropean Cc)mmis~ 
i.  sion should, i.i,l  principle.;lQC?Jsfavqur- . 
'  ably onsuch arrangements.; ...  ·.  .  . ; 
j  -Competition author~tie~, sl19yldpnly·· 
.  object if it  c(ln;dea~ly·pe  shQ.'fA·~?at  arf 
I  aim ,of ~he  !'lrr(;lnge_men~}s..~<i~cr~)l:Wa ·  .·• .. 
I..  d_ominant  po'sftio~;t'-w_it~~il.::t~~·~~9.mm47 
1
·  ..  ·..  rut)r-:o,r. witJl.in}a:sig~i,f~~~rftr~&i9;n,:~r,. ,  '··:: 
market.in the.;context o'f.a'merger;:pdf_  . 
I···  :~~;;tl~e~t.i~~~~t~t~:! 
Europe.  .  :  '.  ..  , .  ~~,  , , , . ,  .  , 
- In this context, ¢ompetiti6ri a;Uthoritigs , : 
.  . shal[take due  account,olthe•:n~.ed.to  :'. :: 
. -promote giob~l  ~offir)etifiv~ii~~~'§fthe'•  ..  ·j 
[. ___  ~-~~I~~-n ·  ai~~:~  indu~trr~:;  .':rL;' ._;  __ ~_~_:_j 
*Not supported by Mr Valladon. 
See "Dissenting opinion" on page 43 I 
l 
Removing  infrastructure bottlenec 
Overall  infrastructure 
Background 
A lack of appropriate infrastructure for air 
transport - the capacity and efficiency of 
airports and air traffic control (ATC) sys-
tems- is a major obstacle to a well-balanced 
development of Europe's air transport 
system. 
User charges paid by air carriers in Europe 
are thus much higher than in other parts of 
the world. These charges amount to 13.5% of 
the airlines' total operating costs. As a result, 
a Europe-based air carrier suffers from a 
major disadvantage against global competi-
tion. The anachronistic fragmentation of the 
European ATC-system is a serious problem 
indeed. 
The Co  mite deplores the lack of political 
willingness by the EU Council of Transport 
Ministers to tackle this ATC problem with 
the urgency needed. Several attempts by the 
European Commission to include air trans-
port in the EC budget on transport infra-
structure have been blocked since 1990, 
regardless of how urgent this matter is. 
Recent technological and political develop-
ments offer excellent opportunities to im-
prove infrastructure significantly. New 
Treaty provisions on the creation of trans-
European networks and the decisions of the 
recent European Council on an immediate 
European initiative for growth, competitive-
ness and employment, allow for major steps 
forward in developing a truly European 
ATC system. So far, efforts to set up such a 
system have been at an impasse. 
This political progress is paralleled by new 
opportunities created by technological 
progress. Satellite-based ATC systems offer 
an enormous potential for cost-savings. They 
should be implemented in the EU as soon as 
possible. This requires a genuinely European 
effort to be coordinated with other regions of 
the world. 
Air  Traffic  Control 
Background 
The present European Air Traffic Control 
system, run from 52 different centres, is 
woefully inadequate. According to some 
estimates, 60 to 70 additional aircraft are 
usually in the air at any given moment 
because of congestion. This has drastic 
effects on economics of airlines, inconven-
ience to passengers and pollution of the air. 
The principle of national sovereignty over 
airspace is, in conjunction with military 
needs, very often used as an excuse by states 
for not implementing urgently required ATC 
measures and, in particular, for failing to 
establish appropriate decision-making rules 
for various European institutions dealing 
with ATC matters. 
The lack of coordination between military 
and civil air space management also creates 
problems. In this respect, a basic reassess-
ment of today's military needs is required. 
Nevertheless, the Comite recognises that 
some progress has been made in this area. 
The ECAC strategy for implementing the 
European Air Traffic Control Harmonisation 
Integration Programme (EATCHIP) repre-
sents an essential step towards improving 
Europe's ATC system in a pragmatic way. 
Similarly, the APATSI programme seeks to improve the flow of air traffic in the vicinity 
of airports. Community support for these 
action programmes must continue and be 
reinforced. However, major institutional 
reforms in Eurocontrol must be envisaged in 
order to allow that body to make decisions 
much more quickly. 
On the other hand, the Comite is far from 
convinced that such pragmatic arrange-
ments, largely based on short-term consid-
erations, will constitute a sufficient medium 
and long-term framework for further im-
proving the capacity and the quality of 
Europe's air traffic management system. 
Major institutional measures are needed for 
accelerating and deepening the process 
towards a genuine European Air Traffic 
Management System. This is particularly 
valid once EATCHIP approaches its so-
called fourth phase. The Comite believes 
that there are no alternatives to a truly Single 
European Air Traffic Management System. 
New satellite-based navigation technologies 
offer enormous potential for increased 
efficiency in ATC, but require that system 
providers ensure the necessary coordination 
at a global level in order. to avoid potential_ 
conflict of interests. The CNS/  ATM (for-
merly FANS) concept provides an appropri-
ate basis for this work. 
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1·  Recommendations·  ...  ..  .  ·  I  h> Jne'JSLfrbp~~n·Up~on' should:  .  .  .  _ · 
r ·.  :~·  pu:t·an.~~n9-, iis q~ic!<W:as possible, t9  ·.  . 
t  ?··  .. ,·  .. tJ:  __ :e .~urrenf  a,~a~h~?rt~stic.  ~mgmepta-·  !I 
F  ::•.-e.:?.?n•of~TQsy~J.e;nsm_Europe:,·· ·.  ·.  . 
r·  .:~work  towards completing the.mternal 
l; :: :  ':.·ffiar~~t· by creat,ing 'a 'single air~p~ce 
t·: ··,  .{t~~~~j~$nlcei:~r~:~9~rdin~tion  at  .. 
l.  "  ..  ,; agiobal f¢velgfnew s,aJellite~based  i 
f::  ·•  ~·ATC techn~logies  ~pd.  develop a.•:  · 
(-,:::·;iong~t~i-in  ;ATC.strategy:fpr; Europe;  . I 
~  ~~''  ~' ~:. -~~: :·~:.·  ~:)  <:.'  '-~: )\ :_  '~- ·:, -~ . .  ...  :·~. '  ,:_·_.  ~  .  ,.··  ·.  ··.  .  :;  .  •' 
t:  /to this ~~d  the  '£u··~houl<,i: . 
~,  \  :o .reirtfqr'ce;its ;sJppb,rrt()r EATC:HIP,. 
f  "''  t  integ<~tid0··6bit'rr>ffk•corikcimn·; • • J 
~;~.4~4l~;~~~£~t;~~~~~~ 
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! ·  . European A~r  Traffic_rvra,n~gep:u;n,t.  ·:_  i 
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costs;  .  .  · · . ·  •  .  , ,  .  . "'  , :i 
b) ensur~ adequat{us,er pchti~ip'ati(Hl '/; 
'  .  .  ,.  '  ,.  '! 
.  .  in monitoring· this Si~gle  Syst~ni;·:  .  ..  ! 
" ' c) hil.ve fina'nci<il autonb.Qly with' .  . .  ; 
·  power to eoll~cffee·§, ~a)se.  fu~ds  ·:: 
_:and  ~rgani~e  plan~il}~:and.piocu~~~. , i 
inent  i11depen9.entJy of the, Rul;>lic .< .•  ·I 
. sector b. udg'  et;  .  '  ·.  ~- '  .  ,•  ..1  ·:.'! 
.·~ stre!lgtll€n the Eur6soh.trol·~~i,l§titu- ...  ; . ! 
· tional framework With a·yiew" td  .. · ,  · ... l 
. e~tablis~ing•assoort.  as.pos_s~~ltF~ear~;· 1 
cut dec~siori~II1aking,rule,s mc!u~mg;.  : .·  i 
majorityy,oting, W,hic~.~~n~;v;f?r<__. · ;.  l 
proper management of_thiEi  ()r~~msa;  •:  ·) 
tion  ·.  .  · ·  ·  .  ·  .<' ·  ~  '  . :  •  Ol 
.- fully support early_ iJilplem~!lt~tion o(. \ 
. CNS/  ATM.technplogy ~.tld;>w?rk.~ ·.  ·.  j 
.  tow<:trds an  autoncwi.'olisa,g~,ricY: to'.  .  ·1 
· . car,ry out theimplefueplation qf 
CNS/AJ:'M.  .  . 
Airports 
Capacity 
Background 
Many major airports within the Community 
are reaching the limits of their capacity. A 
study entitled" A European Planning Strat-
egy for Air Traffic to the Year 2010" carried 
out by the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) 
foresees considerable capacity problems for 
about half of all European airports, even 
when present measures to increase capacity 
are taken into account. 
It is therefore essential to reorient political 
decision-making on airport capacities by 
developing an airport system in a European 
context, instead of leaving such issues 
entirely to local authorities. The European 
Commission's present work on guidelines 
for a Community airport network system is 
strongly welcomed as a step in the right 
direction. 
I 
~ I 
~ 
...  ,.  --··-- - »··  .  - -·-· 
- further develop of guidelines for a 
Community airport network system 
towards an European Airport Capacity· 
Enhancement Plan; 
- make funds available for the ongoing 
analysis of air transport infrastructure 
problems, as well as for the drawing 
up and development of technical/ 
procedural improvement programmes;  ·; 
-tenaciously pursue of infrastructure  · 
improvements based on European 
requirements (and not only defined by 
local or national interests); 
- more actively inform the public of the 
positive economic, social and environ-
mental benefits of air transport. 
Legal constraints on airport construction 
Background 
In some EU States, plans to extend airport 
capacities are confronted with legal barriers 
which can take decades to overcome, if they 
can be overcome at all. 
In a number of Member States, public 
procedures for the planning, construction or 
extension of airports take place in several 
stages and are linked with sometimes 
excessive legal redress for possibly affected 
parties. Obtaining approval several times 
over and dealing with several appeals 
against the same matter results in unaccept-
able delays and thus in the competitive 
distortion mentioned above. This further 
hinders the development of a truly pan-
European air transport system. 
IRecomrilendatioJ:l,  . -- .. _-.---.-1 
J  ~he,:Eur¢pean,Commiss;on  $hould  ., 
exadtine. possibilities for harmonising the 
legal b<tsis and procedure~ within the EU 
territory. for the planning.  artci construc-
tion/  extension of airports and should 
prepare proposals for a fra):llework of 
guidelin~s:Jor application in all Member..  · 
·. States:::"''· ·  ·  ·  · · ·: ·  >: ··  '·  ·  · 
'  ...  '"'" 
~-···----~··:···~~<··. -~~-~~_:__--~~~:.:~'---·-----~--~~: . I 
I 
~ 
Harmonising to reduce costs 
Harmonisation 
Background 
The airline industry needs a strong Euro-
pean internal market to ensure an efficient, 
modern air transport system. 
A priori, such a system calls for the disman-
tling of remaining differences based on 
outdated national constraints and bounda-
ries. Harmonisation, however, is not an end 
in itself. Its ultimate goal is to increase 
efficiency. 
In a number of areas, action should be taken 
as soon as possible to promote further 
integration and, thus, increase the efficiency 
of the internal market. Therefore, such action 
must demonstrate cost-reducing effects. 
In particular, in the current economic cli-
mate, harmonisation measures are only 
helpful if they are demonstrably conducive 
to average lowering of airline costs or to 
substantial improvement of standards. 
When legislative initiatives at EU level 
cannot be justified on such grounds, they 
should be abandoned. 
,- -------_-----~---
!  General recommendations 
1  - The Comite recommends that har~o- · 
I  .  .  .  .  , ;  "  ; \ ..  •  .  .  .  .  .·.,.·  ;,:  .. 
} ·  nisatipn  measur~s  be ~dopteq,.  qhly ·' · 
r.  when th~y  irnprov~}6st~efficier{2y..iri.  0 
t  areas such as air traffiC control, taxa-
!  tion, enyironment,•aircraft certifiCcitio~ 
I ·  and lice~ce~.  for cockpit crew.  Tll,~ife;~.  ·  · 
J  Jor~;.'a;,c~_sf-bene'fif;i~"n~,l)f_siS  :~hqPJ~:;~·)e;,?.l 
f  .  centrai pait of such proposals:·  ',  :: ('-:' .. 
I -Whenever_ these measures would' 
j  increase the average <;:ostburden~f · 
f.  ·  Eu,ropea~  ~ir carriers;.the:y shquld;~<?,! ;' . 
1 ·  be implemented  .. ·.  "F·<  · · _  -- ~  ..  ·,;'·'/:('/ . .  ::, 
L  __ ._,.  _____  ~.::~.: _  _:_i_;.,~  __ _:_  __  ._...J::..::~::>~:..-.  ..:...~:.1~-:.·~.:.~:.:~::..J~--~~-·:.~.,;,.~~J 
Aircraft  certification 
Background 
European countries have different criteria 
for aircraft certification.This results in 
unnecessary bureaucratic burdens and 
delays which are costly to airlines. 
The Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) are 
working at coordinating rules and specifica-
tions but hold no delegated authority to 
make decisions. As things stand now, a 
mutual recognition of all certificates issued 
by national civil aviation authorities remains 
a distant perspective. 
Moreover, in addition to intra-European 
discrepancies and singularities, differences 
exist between US and European specifica-
tions for US-manufactured aircraft. Again, 
this situation results in an extra financial 
burden serving no purpose at all. 
-·--····-·••••"'"""'"""••••u•· 
Recommendations 
··••·  ~1 
-The ongoing standardisation efforts by 
the JAA should be encouraged and the 
JAA should be urged to speed up their 
work.  The EUshouldpress Member. 
.States to promptly agree on the mutual 
recognition ·of certificates based on  ·· 
JAA recommendations. 
- Beyond this, the Comite strongly 
recommends establishing a Single 
· ·European CeitificationAuthority, 
which would (a) end the duplication of 
decision-making bodies and (b) be in a 
better position to reach agreement on 
..•  mutual rec()gnition with the US. 
Training  programmes 
and  competence  standards 
Background 
Even though they all meet ICAO standards, 
the national training programmes and 
competence standards for cockpit crew 
remain substantially different among Mem-
. ber States of the EU. 
This is one reason for the difficulties encoun-
tered by airlines in recruiting pilots licenced 
in other Member States. This situation 
denies employees the freedom to work 
anywhere in the Community and it denies 
airlines the flexibility they need. This is in 
clear contradiction to one of the most basic 
tenets of the Single European Market. 
The situation of other staff involved in the 
safety of flight operations, like flight engi-
neers, is similar. It is equally desirable, both 
to improve the efficiency of the internal 
market and for safety reasons, that staff in 
air traffic control be licenced under common 
standards. r  ~tti~:::e:t~~:t:~;:lwuid  ;ec~~=~:-l 
pilot licences issued by other EU  i 
Member States.  ·  · 
. :- To achieve this rriut:ual recognition, the 
Community should establish ~binrnon 
training and competence levels for 
cockpit crew. This would bind Member 
States and Community air carriers to 
. the sarp.e rules.  .  ' \· ':'  .. .  ·..  \  .  .  .. 
- The first step woUlS' be to harmonise 
existing national training programmes 
and establish a single set of profes-
sional standards. The harmonisation of- · 
..  prograqunes and::~tandai:ds shoul¢1. be 
extended to othefaii:line and air  traffic · 
controlstaff involved in the safety of 
air operations. 
--~~~--------~~--~ 
Aircraft  maintenance 
Background 
A high level of flight safety must be main-
tained in Europe. 
The JAA have developed a set of minimum 
standards and conditions for aircraft mainte-
nance which have been incorporated into 
Community law. Yet, the European Commis-
sion does not have the authority to supervise 
the implementation of those standards. 
Some airlines do their aircraft maintenance 
outside their home country, either in Europe 
or in other parts of the world. 
f'-i;-~~mniend~ti~;~~---:-_  -------.-.-~---1 
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The financial landscape 
The economic analysis in Chapter II has 
shown that the financial status of major air 
carriers has deteriorated and that most 
major European air carriers have suffered 
heavy losses over the last years. Increasingly, 
cash-flow does not cover an adequate part of 
self-financed investment. 
As a result of indebtedness, financial costs 
have sharply increased. A worsening debt/ 
equity ratio weakens the borrowing capacity 
of air carriers. Inappropriate taxation rules 
compound the financial problems. 
Against this background, the European 
airline industry's ability to finance participa-
tion in future growth is endangered. Euro-
pean air carriers have placed orders for 
aircraft deliveries amounting to 22%  of the 
Western manufacturers' backlog. Financing 
these purchases may mean that the total 
debt of the eight largest Community air 
carriers will reach 60% of all revenues 
expected for 1995. 
At the same time the debt/  equity ratio may 
reach a totally unsatisfactory level of 80/20 
unless a return to significantly improved 
profitability is achieved. 
One may argue that a significant slow-down 
of delivery cycles will have to be part of the 
solution for this financial impasse. Present 
world-wide overcapacity ~symbolised by 
more than a 1,000 grounded jet aircraft (9% 
of total Western built fleet) - appears to 
support this argument, at first sight. 
However, it is expected that only 300 of 
these aircraft will ever be put back into 
service. The rest will become obsolete as a 
result of more recent and strict noise rules 
affecting aircraft of this age. 
In addition, airlines have already reacted to 
overcapacity by cancelling orders and 
postponing deliveries. Since 1991, the annual 
worldwide production of jetliners has been 
declining. 
However, traffic growth has now recovered 
to an average level of 6% a year. It is widely 
expected that this growth rate will be sus-
tained in the short and medium term. 
At the same time the average airline load 
factor (the percentage of available seats 
occupied by revenue passengers) has started 
to improve again. Overcapacity is expected 
to be gradually absorbed, allowing the rate 
of aircraft annual deliveries to increase once 
more from 1995/96 onward. 
In the long run (until the year 2000), the 
demand for new jet aircraft, for the renewal 
and modernisation of fleets, will represent 
an expenditure worldwide of about $30 
billion a year, of which approximately $8 
billion will have to be spent in Europe. 
The traditional methods of financing these 
aircraft purchases have lost part of their 
effectiveness due to: 
- inadequate cashflow; 
- insufficient profitability hampering access 
to capital markets; 
- poor balance sheets that hurt borrowing 
capacity; 
- reduced resale value of aircraft and the 
increasing risks of lessors; 
- limited ability by manufacturers to under-
write customer financing; 
- uncertainties about future airline market 
structure. 
In addition to these generally valid financial 
constraints, European carriers suffer from 
specific impediments: 
- access to capital markets more limited 
than for US airlines; 
- limited access to credit insurance systems; 
- financing structures less tax efficient than 
in the United States (e.g. leverage leases); 
- purchase of new aircraft more expensive 
than for US airlines (5% on average, due to 
size of orders); 
- aircraft financing denominated in US 
dollars, putting some European airlines at 
a considerable exchange rate risk; 
Removing the deadlock for most major 
airlines' funding of future investments will 
require: 
- a rapid return to profitability; 
- a strengthening of balance sheets; 
- improved access to financial markets. Taxes  and  government 
imposed  charges 
Background 
Taxation in various forms decisively deter-
mines any industry's ability to finance 
investments. Above average corporate . 
taxation in conjunction with effective (na-
tional) control requirements puts a major 
disadvantage on the European airline 
industry because it seriously hampers self-
financed investments. 
Taxation policies in Europe imply, because of 
existing fragmentation among EU Member 
States in the area of corporate taxes and 
certain side-effects of the creation of the 
Single Market, additional constraints. It is 
possible that value-added tax (VAT) will be 
imposed on air travel when the present 
interim regime ends in 1997. An anachronis-
tic fragmentation in the area of corporate 
taxation makes it difficult for air carriers to 
use innovative forms of financing invest-
ments on a genuine European-wide basis. 
Environmental issues may lead to the 
introduction of a so-called carbon tax. Its 
basic underlying idea, i.e. to promote· the use 
of alternative forms of energy, is not valid in 
relation to air transport where no alterna-
tives to the use of kerosene is, as a commer-
cially viable option, in sight. 
More generally, high indirect taxation 
reduces the demand for air travel and puts 
additional pressure on yields. 
European air carriers have to compete head-
on with companies from other parts of the 
world. Tax treatment that is comparable to 
that of world competitors is important for 
the long-term viability of a European-based 
industry and for promotion of growth and 
employment. New taxes and charges levied 
directly on air travellers and cargo, add to 
the overall price of travel and, if unchecked, 
could impede growth in the longer term. 
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-:European taxes. arid  charges speeifi-
.. callyaffecting air transport should be 
'harmonisedconsistently at the lowest 
I  ,  'possible level.  · 
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pean internal traffic,  . .  .. 
-Any additional taxation with a.,particu-
lar impact on  European air transport, 
air travellers and cargo shoul<;i be 
avoided.  ·  ·  ·' 
- The EU  should speed up w9rk to-
wards a genuine ho;trmo'nised system of 
corporate taxation. 
- As a signifiduit step towards. tax 
harmonisation for the:airline industry; 
the European Commission. should  . 
examine, as a matter of urgencY,· 
possibilities to improve access to'tax. 
lease arrangement's for the purchase of 
aircraft by European air carriers 
through:·  ··  ··  ·· 
a) facilitation of access to fiscal posi~ 
tions.  . 
b) inclusion of early deprec~atio~· 
schemes for investment in. new 
equipment. 
-To facilitate capacity adjustment and 
removal of overcapacity, Me.!llber 
States should, through a proposal to be 
developed by the Europeari.C.oinmis~ 
sion, agree to establish, for a limited 
period of time (4 years), a preferential 
tax treatment for capital gains  from 
aircraft sales.  ·  · 
-VAT on air navigation charges should 
be harmonised through the EU. When 
applied, it should be made deductible. 
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Aircraft  procurement 
Background 
There are currently only three Western 
manufacturers of aircraft with over 130 seats 
and worldwide only one for aircraft with 
over 400 seats. When buying new aircraft, 
Community air carriers must be able to 
benefit from competition between manufac-
turers. They should receive treatment equal 
to their competitors'. 
Considering the economic and strategic 
importance of air transport, it is important 
that the EU work towards: 
- allowing Community air carriers to obtain 
the best purchase terms from competing 
manufacturers by fostering competition 
among aircraft and engine manufacturers 
and financial institutions; 
-ensure access at any time to at least one 
European source of supply. I 
~ 
Aircraft purchases are currently paid in US 
dollars. Because airlines earn revenues in 
various currencies, they are e~posed to 
exchange risks, and even more so if they 
have no or few revenues in US dollars. 
~ 
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Access  to  financial  markets 
Background 
Even if normal profitability of the European 
airline industry is restored, problems may 
remain for funding investments. In the first 
instance, the industry needs access to new 
equity. 
Beyond current shareholders, such equity 
increases might be obtained by access to 
normal equity markets or by alliances with 
financial institutions or other industrial 
companies, in particular with other air 
carriers. In the case of European partner-
ships, it may be necessary to overcome 
restrictions resulting from the requirement 
for national ownership and control as 
included in most bilateral agreements 
between individual Member States and third 
countries. In the case of a partnership from 
outside the EU, access is limited by the 
requirement of majority Community owner-
ship for carriers with EU status. 
To pave the way towards commercially 
meaningful and legally feasible alliances and 
better access to foreign equity markets, it 
should be envisaged to limit ownership and 
control requirements strictly to what is really 
necessary for compliance with EU, WEU 
and NATO strategic economic policies. 
Even if  the availability of traditional modes 
of financing were to improve, a "funding 
gap" may remain, at present estimated at 
35% of overall financial needs. Therefore it is 
appropriate to take action aimed at easing 
access to current and new sources of fund-
ing. 
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Background 
Markets outside the EU are of enormous 
economic importance to Community air 
carriers. For the majority of them, operations 
to non-European countries account for more 
than half of their activity and in some cases 
more than 70%. This can be contrasted with 
the major US airlines where international 
services account for less than 30% of total 
operations. 
The approval in 1983 of the Council Direc-
tive on Interregional Air Services and subse-
quently in 1987, 1990 and 1992 of the three 
air transport policy packages, gradually 
transformed the Community's "interna-
tional" bilateral system into a "domestic" 
system based on multilateral principles. 
This development of the Single European 
Aviation Market is fully compatible with the 
Chicago Convention which governs the 
broad principles of international aviation. 
Commercial aviation relations between 
Member States of the European Union and 
third countries remain, however, governed 
with few exceptions by bilateral agreements. 
There are currently an average of some 60-70 
bilateral air services agreements between 
each EU Member State and third countries. 
These agreements are affected by consider-
able government influence, frequent renego-
tiation, and, in most cases, are based on a 
protectionist approach to economic issues. 
Member States' bilateral agreements with 
non-EU states differ considerably in the 
nature of the competitive regime they create. 
As a result, such bilateral agreements with 
non-EU countries have a substantial com-
petitive impact on traffic to and from neigh-
bouring countries, and in the case of major 
markets, on Europe as a whole. The creation 
of the internal market has strengthened this 
spill-over effect. 
By and large, the bilateral agreements ignore 
the new realities of the Single European 
Aviation Market. Their existence raises 
questions of conflict with key provisions of 
the new regulatory environment of the 
Community, particularly with regard to 
national control requirements. 
These provisions hinder the designation of 
Community air carriers for the operation of 
air services from points in Member States 
other than the state of registration to non-EU 
states. 
Furthermore, many bilateral agreements 
with non-European states, particularly those 
with more mature economies, are under 
great strain. Some are becoming rigid 
because of overly detailed operating condi-
tions, while others are simply becoming 
unmanageable as markets globalise and 
interrelate. Again, these effects are rein-
forced by the establishment of the EU's 
internal aviation market. 
For countries with less mature economies, 
however, the bilateral system appears to still 
work effectively, although developing 
countries have expressed concerns that their 
existing traffic rights should not be devalued 
as a result of an EU approach on external 
aviation policy. 
Community air carriers are now legally 
entitled to establish themselves anywhere 
within the EU territory. 
They should have the possibility to be 
designated to fly to any point in the world, 
provided the bilateral parties involved 
agree. In the first year of the Single Euro-
pean Aviation Market, they made few 
attempts to use their new freedoms within 
the Community. Not one scheduled air 
carrier seems to have asked to serve a non-
EU destination from a Member State other 
than~its home country. A common policy 
toward third countries as to carrier designa-
tion would prevent distortions and open up 
effective opportunities for Community air 
carriers. 
To the extent that there are inconsistencies 
between the Community legislation and the 
bilateral agreements of the EU Member 
States, the Rome Treaty (Art. 234) makes it 
mandatory for states to eliminate such 
inconsistencies. This may affect existing 
bilateral relations and new agreements. 
Since EU Member States have not imple-
mented this provision so far, there is consid-
erable risk that such agreements could be 
nullified by the European Court of Justice. The need for a common external policy 
Apart from legal reasons, the compelling 
economic reason to establish a common 
external aviation policy now is to comple-
ment the internal market with rules to 
ensure a level playing field. There is consid-
erable pressure from the European Commis-
sion and the European Parliament to adopt 
such an external policy, but Member States-
for a variety of reasons - have so far been 
reluctant to move forward on this issue. 
Without a common external policy, bilateral 
agreements will continue to create imbal-
ances between Member States, lead to 
discrimination and weaken the Community 
as a whole, thus reducing the potential for 
increased airline efficiency made possible by 
the Third Package. 
To maximise their effectiveness and effi-
ciency, airlines must be able to serve any 
destination in the world from any point in 
the Community- providing of course that 
the non-EU state involved agrees to it. 
Airlines need to expand their markets 
sensibly and flexibly to improve their long-
te'rm commercial viability and their global 
competitiveness. However, in many coun-
tries with mature economies the prospects 
for growth by bilateral exchanges are lim-
ited. Community-wide agreements offer 
better possibilities for setting up the most 
effective airline network. And because access 
to the EU market is important for many 
third country air carriers, a new generation 
of Community-wide agreements will offer 
Community air carriers new business 
opportunities. 
This is in particular the case in relation to the 
United States today.  It will become increas-
ingly true with the major growth markets in 
Asia. A common external aviation policy is 
required to bring into play Europe as a 
whole. 
A common external·policy, developed and 
structured on a step by step basis in a 
similar way that the internal market policy 
was developed, will: 
-benefit Europe's airlines, provided that 
imbalances in scale and scope of operation 
are taken into consideration, and provided 
also that true reciprocity and equal oppor-
tunity are achieved; 
-increase competitive service, product and· 
price options for travellers; 
-deliver significant economic benefits of 
increased travel and tourism to national 
economies. 
A common external policy will allow 
Europe's airlines: 
- to serve the world markets from any point 
of their internal European systems; 
- to exploit network efficiencies and become 
more effective global competitors; 
-to benefit from a consistent nondiscrimina-
tory regulatory framework for short and 
long-term decision making. 
The common external policy will also allow 
a more consistent and transparent approach 
to dealing with non-European states and 
airlines. On the one hand it will dispel 
concerns about discriminatory treatment, 
and on the other hand it will give a basis for 
increased reciprocal market access across 
Europe as a whole. 
The development of such a policy can be 
undertaken in full compatibility with the 
Chicago Convention (bearing in mind 
ongoing examinations within the Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization) and can 
be generally consistent with bilateral agree-
ments. Specific adaptation of these agree-
ments to reflect the legal and aeropolitical 
realities of the Single European Aviation 
Market may, however, require renegotiation 
of certain aspects of these agreements. 
The question is, therefore, not whether there 
should be a common external policy, but 
what its component elements should be, 
where and when it should be applied, and 
how, in particular, to handle the transition 
from national policies effectively, equitably, 
without competitive distortion and major 
market disruptions. Recognising that it is not feasible to switch 
immediately from Member States' bilateral 
agreements to fully fledged Community 
agreements, the Comite recommends that 
the Council of Ministers first agree on 
principles of how to establish, step by step, 
the Community external policy. 
A binding framework should provide for 
rules applying to any future negotiation. 
In the Comite's opinion, such regulations 
should ensure that: 
- all bilateral agreements are transparent; 
- all existing bilateral traffic rights (sched 
uled and non-scheduled services) are 
preserved; 
- any new agreement is compatible with 
Community legislation; 
- an agreed basis for interim Community 
dialogue with non-EU countries be set out 
pending development of a formal external 
policy. 
In establishing such binding framework 
regulations, the key question should not be 
who exercises control, but how can the most 
effective policy be put in place with the 
minimum bureaucracy and distortion of 
competition.  In this context, the principle of 
subsidiarity, where necessary, will be helpful 
when allocating, within a Community 
framework, negotiating tasks between 
Member States and the Community. 
Considering that bilateral agreements must 
be made compatible with the Single Euro-
pean Aviation Market, the replacement of 
nationality clauses by a Community clause is 
an overriding priority for any negotiation. 
Policy  priorities  in  relation  to 
specific  regions 
There are a number of areas where action is 
to be contemplated - in some cases under a 
"bilateral" approach and in others using the 
"multilaterally" oriented Single European 
Aviation Market as a model to further 
develop the Community policy on external 
aviation relations. 
United States 
This market is the largest in the world and is 
the most interrelated with Europe. It is 
ready to enter into negotiations with the 
Community - as recommended by the US 
National Commission to Ensure a Strong 
Competitive Airline Industry and repeatedly 
stated by the US Secretary of Transport. 
The dialogue could initially explore the air 
cargo market, which is virtually deregulated and could provide valuable experience for 
negotiations of passenger services. Other 
issues ripe for discussion are the establish-
ment of common rules for CRS, the applica-
tion of competition rules, and other doing 
business conditions. · 
A step by step approach would facilitate the 
progressive competitive restructuring of 
European carriers, leading to benefits for 
consumers and economies on both sides of 
the Atlantic. 
Asia/Pacific 
As the fastest growing market in the world 
with important trade and tourism flows to 
and from Europe, this market offers signifi-
cant opportunity for traffic development, 
although market access is highly regulated 
in several countries in the region, the dy-
namics of the market place suggest an 
increasing pressure for liberalisation. 
A number of Asian/Pacific countries have 
expressed specific interest in the develop-
ment of the Community's common external 
policy and have voiced strong concerns that 
the European aviation market should remain 
open. This gives an opportunity for Europe 
to take the initiative in establishing on a 
reciprocal basis genuine open market re-
gimes where applicable. The EU should now 
capitalise on this opportunity. 
Eastern and Central Europe 
The increasingly close economic, political 
and social relations between the EU and 
neighbouring countries of Europe are lead-
ing towards a common European ground of 
interest. The coming into force of the Euro-
pean Economic Area will extend to EFTA 
countries (except Switzerland) the Commu-
nity's internal aviation policy. With funda-
mental political changes in Central and 
Eastern European countries, travel offers 
new opportunities for cross-cultural and 
business exchanges and improved prospects 
for rapid economic and political integration 
in the European sphere. 
Recently concluded association agreements 
foresee the integration of these countries into 
the Community's aviation policy. First steps 
towards enlarging the application scope of 
Community principles should be taken soon. 
In the long term, the possibility to create a 
larger European aviation area should be 
contemplated. 
Developing countries 
The modernisation of the air transport 
industry in the developing countries, par-
ticularly the Africa/Caribbean/Pacific or so-
called "ACP" countries, is a condition for 
their social and economic development. The 
cooperation between the EU and these 
nations should be improved for the mutual 
benefit of both parties. The existing traffic 
rights of developing countries' airlines in the 
EU should not be questioned. 
With time, the progressive nature of the EU's 
external aviation policy should help encour-
age these states to integrate their airline 
industry into a more open world system. EU 
policy should also help them to expand 
travel and tourism services, to the benefit of 
their own economies. In the meantime, 
Europe should provide the necessary assist-
ance for further development of safe and 
reliable air transport systems in these coun-
tries. The EU should abstain from putting 
additional burdens on them. ENSURING  THE  RIGHT  BALANCE 
Airports and air carriers as partners 
Background 
Paving the way for cost savings is not only 
an issue of improving quantity and quality 
of air transport infrastructure. Additionally, 
it is necessary to look at rules for using this 
infrastructure and to ensure that such rules 
work as incentives for improvements to the 
efficiency of the air transport system. This is 
particularly valid in the air carrier-airport 
relationship. 
Airports have an ambivalent role in the air 
transport system. They are, on the one hand, 
part of the overall public infrastructure 
providing services to aviation and ensuring 
the best possible links for their catchment 
area. As infrastructure providers they must 
provide facilities and services impartially to 
all carriers. 
On the other hand, airports are forced to 
finance maintenance, improvements and 
extensions of such facilities. In addition, the 
overlapping of catchment areas in Europe 
increases competition between airports. This 
creates a strong incentive for individual 
airport managements to adopt normal 
entrepreneurial behaviour. Many airports 
are, therefore, organised as independent 
enterprises. 
This role is further complicated by the fact 
that essential airport services (use of run-
ways and apron areas) represent a natural 
monopoly, in particular if point-to-point 
traffic dominates the traffic volume. 
In an individual airline's perspective, priori-
ties are somewhat clearer: because air 
carriers must operate in a competitive 
environment they have a strong interest in 
rules that ensure effective incentives for 
improving efficiency and which provide a 
strong disincentive against monopoly 
practices and pricing. 
At the same time, however, air carriers have 
a solid self-interest in not undermining the 
effectiveness of airport operations and the 
financial stability of airports and, in particu-
lar, airports' ability to mobilise the funds 
needed for developing airport infrastructure 
and for restructuring handling services 
towards more efficiency. 
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Dissenting opinion 
of Messrs Scholch/Valladon 
- The  European Commission should recog-
nise airports as public institutions providing 
infrastructure to aviation, as well as inde-
pendent enterprises within the aviation 
sector, being in competition among them-
selves, with all rights to an independent 
business policy. 
-The Commission may urge European 
airports to liberalise ground handling 
services at Community airports only if local 
conditions allow this without severe negative 
effects on  their functions as an 
infrastructural institution, or on  their ability 
to invest according to the needs of further 
development of aviation and airports' 
competitiveness. 
Under all circumstances airports must 
remain in a position  to ensure safety and 
security of their operations by licencing all 
service providers. - Airports being classified as coordinated 
airports according to the Council Regulation 
95/93  on common rules for the allocation of 
slots at Community airports should be in 
principle entitled to limit or exclude compe-
tition in ground handling services, provided 
that such limitation or exclusion of competi-
tion contributes to their ability to provide 
sufficient airport capacity. 
-The European Commission may adopt 
legislation to ensure that pricing of airports 
is made transparent and that quality of 
airport services is guaranteed, where compe-
tition in ground handling services cannot 
fully or in part be admitted by the airports. 
- The EU should clarify in its legislation that 
airports that open ground handling services 
to competition can charge sufficient fees for 
use of their infrastructure through self 
handling, third party handling or handling 
by agents as well as an adequate concession 
fee for  the exploitation of the market created 
by the airports. 
-The EU should ensure that eventual 
opening up of ground handling services to 
competition does not severely jeopardise 
employment and working conditions of 
personnel employed in this field.  In particu-
lar the working conditions of all providers of 
ground handling services must be harmo-
nised to prevent distortion of competition, 
unjust exploitation of the working force and 
social disruption caused by this. Caring for the environment 
Background 
All transport industries by their nature have 
environmental consequences. The European 
air transport industry is no exception, but it 
has already invested and continues to invest 
heavily in managing its environment respon-
sibly. Indeed, managing the environment is a 
key issue for the quality of human life, and 
economic activities such as air transport 
must increasingly prove compatible with 
desirable environmental standards and 
public sensitivity to environmental issues. 
The European air transport industry has 
made considerable progress in reducing the 
environmental impact of its multi-faceted 
activities. This progress is clearly demon-
strated in the adoption of stricter noise 
standards for aircraft, airport management 
strategies that reduce this problem, and the 
construction or improvement of airport 
complexes which are designed to superior 
levels of energy conservation, noise abate-
ment and site improvement. 
Moreover, these achievements are of particu-
lar merit when compared with other major 
regions, for example the United States. The 
higher percentage of Chapter 3 certified 
aircraft in European airline fleets (69% 
against 61% in the US) also indicates, among 
other factors, the willingness of European 
carriers to shoulder the costs of improving 
the environment despite the competitive 
implications of such efforts in an increas-
ingly global market. Also, independent 
ratings show that a number of European 
airport complexes are amongst the best in 
the world. 
Efforts in environmental management will 
have to continue. Improving the environ-
mental impact of the industry is, like pro-
ductivity improvements, a permanent task 
for policy makers and for management. 
However, future action must take into 
account the overall competitive situation of 
the European airline industry; and the fact 
that, being a global industry, a number of 
European airports will continue to have to 
accept, even with constraints, aircraft from 
other countries, particularly the Third 
World, which do not and will not meet the 
highest environmental standards. Any 
envisaged, or future, European legislation 
should therefore be predicated only on a 
solid analysis of cost effectiveness. Such 
legislation must provide that the measures 
envisaged do not unilaterally penalise the 
European air transport industry, either in 
terms of cost or in terms of how infrastruc-
ture is used. 
Reducing emissions caused by congestion on 
the ground and in the air is the most obvious 
area for reconciling the need for environ-
mental protection while taking into account 
economic concerns. Some 60-70 aircraft are 
always in the air at any given moment 
because of congestion problems. Improving 
European air traffic control and enhancing 
the capacity of European airports to accom-
modate "Category 3" aircraft (which can 
safely land under most weather conditions) 
will have a major impact on reducing con-
gestion-induced emissions on the ground 
and in the air. Some of these constraints, 
technically speaking, can be removed at little 
cost. Military airspace management in areas 
around civil airports, for example, creates 
excess fuel consumption and emissions. This 
could be brought to an end immediately. 
Noise 
Aircraft noise remains a problem for many 
people living near airports, even though 
noise levels have been substantially reduced 
through technological advances which more 
than compensated the increase in air traffic. 
These improvements do also flow through to 
Third World fleets, although after some 
delays. 
After years of substantial improvement, it is 
expected that further incremental reductions 
in noise will become more costly. This means 
that the cost/benefit of further noise reduc-
tion may present a more serious challenge to 
manufacturers and airlines. 
Consequently, future progress in decreasing 
the impact of aircraft noise on populations 
must, in view of further growth, depend 
more on improved land use planning 
around airports than in affordable techno-
logical breakthroughs. When compared to 
land or maritime transport, air transport is 
certainly causing no more damage to envi-
ronment, taking into account the number of 
passengers or freight tonnes carried. Considerable reductions in noise levels have 
been achieved by the industry since the 
introduction of the modern airliner, culmi-
nating in the introduction in 1990 of a tough 
global noise standard-by the ICAO. This so-
called Chapter 3 of Annex 16 of the Chicago 
Convention will result in the progressive 
removal of the noisiest aircraft from Euro-
pean fleets starting in 1995. 
The European Commission is preparing a 
proposal which would mandate a further 
reduction in noise levels. The introduction of 
separate, more stringent European noise 
standards would result in increased costs to 
European airlines and put them at a unilat-
eral economic disadvantage against their 
global competitors. Moreover, the benefits, 
because of the noise and emission inequali-
ties of the world's airline fleets, would be 
only marginal at Europe's busiest airports 
which must continue to accept aircraft from 
all over the world. 
Emissions 
Concern about aircraft engine emissions 
centers on two specific gases: carbon dioxide 
(C02), which is directly derived from fuel, 
and nitrogen oxides (NOx) which are 
formed from nitrogen in the air passing 
through the combustion section of the 
engine. 
Commercial air transport accounts for 1.3% 
of global carbon dioxide emissions. Nitrogen 
oxides emissions are more difficult to esti-
mate. Current scientific opinion is that they 
may make a contribution of 0.2% to global 
warming*. 
The best way to reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions is to decrease fuel consumption. 
As far as NOx is concerned, ICAO recom-
mended in 1993 a 20% reduction in engine 
NOx emissions from standards first estab-
lished in 1981. A proposal prepared by the 
European Commission would ask for a 
further 20%  reduction. 
The economically most efficient way to 
reduce energy consumption as well as 
hazardous emissions is to optimise aircraft 
utilisation in the air and on the ground. The 
airlines' efforts in that direction are all too 
often thwarted by shortages or deficiencies 
in the air transport system's infrastructure, 
as now demonstrated by obsolete rules on 
* Source : Energy Research Centre of  the Netherlands 
the use of military airspace, and the conse-
quences of delays in the air and on the 
ground caused by air traffic control and 
inadequate airport infrastructure. 
Airports 
European airport construction and improve-
ments have taken significant steps in envi-
ronmental management in recent years. This 
has been due to the concern of all the parties 
involved, to improve, through better man-
agement, the environmental impact of 
airport complexes. Substantially increased 
consultation now occurs between airlines 
and airport designers, so as to improve the 
efficiency of airport complexes. Energy loads 
are monitored and reduced, wherever 
possible, noise abatement within terminals 
has improved noticeably, and many airports 
now have specific site management pro-
grammes. Within the European context, a 
significant factor of change for the future of 
airport design and management will be the 
disappearance of internal European frontier 
controls. 
A rapid resolution of this issue by all EU 
countries will significantly simplify the 
management of internal spaces in European 
airports and in the design of new ones, and 
should be encouraged. 
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Background 
It is clear from the fact-finding part of this 
report that the European airline industry 
could and should be much more productive 
than it is. The thrust of this report is to show 
ways to tackle - on all fronts - this productiv-
ity gap. This may initially mean redundan-
cies. 
The main emphasis of this report is on 
taking away various obstacles to seizing new 
business opportunities. Because air transport 
will continue to be a growth industry, the 
priority must be to create conditions that 
allow European airlines to participate in this 
growth in a profitable way. This is the only 
sustainable way to maintain and to create 
employment in Europe and to avoid a large-
scale loss of jobs to other regions of the 
world. The growth of air travel-related 
business will help to increase overall em-
ployment. 
In addition, cost reductions in areas beyond 
direct airline management control will avoid 
a situation where labour alone pays the price 
for the required efficiency improvements. 
The EU's Single Internal Market must be 
made fully effective. This is in line with the 
priorities outlined in the European Commis-
sion's recent "White Paper on Growth, 
Competitiveness and Employment". 
In this context, the emphasis of this "White 
Paper" on the creation of Trans European 
Networks also fully fits with the recommen-
dations on air transport infrastructure 
contained in this report. 
Supportive social policy measures may be 
required for increasing labour flexibility. For 
example, more flexible laws and company 
rules on part-time work, weekend work, 
night work etc. would, given the operating 
patterns of the airline industry, help to  · 
maintain and to create jobs. Additionally, 
measures to increase mobility and support 
retraining will help to overcome remaining 
problems in some Member States. 
Dissenting  opinion  of  Mr  Valladon 
Until recently, air transport has been an industry 
bound by government decisions.  This has not 
prevented the industry from experiencing 
considerable economic, industrial, and techno-
logical development, quite the contrary. 
The industry has always been able to adapt to the 
increasing demand of its different users' needs. 
In  the past several years, the industry has been 
confronted with recession which has put into 
question its entire organisation, at the risk of 
throwing the baby out with the bath water. 
At a time when through the GATT negotiations, 
one can hope that rules organising international 
markets will be put into place, it would be 
paradoxical that air transport follow  the opposite 
path by orienting itself towards total free trade 
only based on fare wars. Should the European Union submit to this trend 
or oppose it? 
In other words, must Europe simply become, on a 
global level, a purely free-trade region,  no matter 
what the price for employees? 
This general political problem  is particularly 
acute for international air transport, an  industry 
which by its very nature can relocate, and even 
more so for its employees. 
Even if the different measures recommended by 
the Comite are quickly implemented and have 
their full impact, thus giving European airlines 
the means to achieve a level. of competitiveness 
comparable to  US companies, who can  be sure 
that suicidal fare wars will stop? 
Once this  "gap" with US airlines is closed, will 
there be another  "gap" with Asian airlines to be 
closed too; when  the network structures of both 
are fundamentally different from  European 
airlines? 
If this should be the case, the spiral of competi-
tiveness at all costs can only result in putting 
into question income levels, working conditions 
and social security for employees, and, ulti-
mately, in a massive destruction of jobs in 
Europe. 
The example of maritime transport shows that 
this path is a dead end. 
-It is not by destroying current jobs, that new 
jobs will be created. 
- It is not through the disappearance of national 
flag carriers in favour of new entrants. 
-It is by organising the European internal 
market to allow competition which would 
respect current standards of living and social 
benefits. 
-It is by organising the defense of European 
interests on  the global/eve/ that air transport 
can come out of its present crisis. 
( 
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linking modes of transport 
Background 
Air transport is just one part of the overall 
transport system. The relationship between 
modes of transport (air, road and rail) is, 
overwhelmingly, a complementary one. Each 
mode has its comparative advantages and 
disadvantages depending on the require-
ments of the market. 
As a general rule, it is not up to public 
authorities to predetermine the use of 
modes. Such use depends on the priorities 
and needs of individual users in terms of 
distance, speed, flexibility, etc. to determine 
which mode is most advantageous. 
Free choice for transport users requires that 
the same cost imputation principles apply to 
all modes of transport. This precondition 
clearly does not exist in the rail transport/ 
air transport interface. The result is a certain 
amount of discrimination against air trans-
port services. 
However, the Comite notes a privileged 
treatment of railways based on concerns for 
road congestion. 
There is both complementarity and competi-
tion between air transport and rail transport. 
To some extent, a competitive relationship 
between High Speed Train (HST) systems 
and air transport exists. 
On the other hand, there is an enormous 
potential for improving complementarity 
between HST-systems and air transport. The 
issue is to make full use of this potential 
instead of maintaining artificial barriers to 
coordination, simply because of competition 
between the two modes. 
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interference 
Background 
As an infant industry, air transport has been 
protected by governments and has remained 
for decades a part of government policy on 
foreign, economic and social issues. State 
ownership and government interference in 
the airlines' management decisions resulted 
in a number of statutory rules and con-
straints, air carriers often being seen as 
providers of government-imposed services. 
For example, airlines were required to 
operate non-profitable routes, forced to 
purchase certain types of aircraft, bound by 
state-imposed pension schemes, etc. 
Certain constraints have slowly been elimi-
nated while others have been added. Immi-
gration policy is a prime example of this 
situation. In order to control the flow of 
illegal immigrants into Europe, some Mem-
ber States require airlines to check passenger 
travel documents. These Member States then 
impose fines which increasingly penalise 
airlines for the transportation of inad-
equately-documented passengers. The result 
is a costly excess burden on the airlines. 
All of these obligations imposed on airlines 
hamper their commercial freedom and are 
major obstacles to their ability to restructure 
themselves into normal commercial entities. 
This does not mean, however, that the new 
regulatory environment in Europe necessi-
tates total non-interference of governments. 
It does mean that any such intervention 
must be done in a transparent and nondis-
criminatory way and that European air 
carriers must be compensated for the extra 
burden resulting from such interference. 
For example, maintenance and development 
of regular air services on routes to periph-
eral regions occasionally require government 
intervention. This remains entirely possible, 
under the Third Package, which sets out the 
criteria for such government intervention. 
.  ....  ~. APPENDICES 
The  Regulatory  Landscape 
European Union Member States are parties 
to the 1944 Chicago Convention on Interna-
tional Civil Aviation, which globally organ-
ises international air transport. Member 
States are members of ICAO and remain 
committed to the principles and rules of the 
Convention. They have, for instance, ac-
knowledged that every state has exclusive 
sovereignty over the airspace above its 
territory. Based on this and other provisions, 
and on the Annexes to the Convention 
updated by ICAO, all governments have 
exchanged traffic rights in numerous bilat-
eral air transport agreements, thereby 
creating a closely knit network of arrange-
ments that contain a substantial set of 
derived customary rules. These rules are 
binding to the parties to such agreements, in 
addition to the rules multilaterally agreed in 
the Convention. 
It is a fact that almost all countries of the 
world have adhered to the Convention and 
are, in one way or another, bound by more 
or less similar exclusive bilateral rules, with 
the exception of recent liberal agreements. 
Yet a distinction must be made between the 
Chicago Convention and the bilateral agree-
ments. 
The Convention is a general framework, 
based on largely political considerations, 
containing firm principles of law: state 
sovereignty, nationality of aircraft, equal 
opportunities and equal treatment for all 
countries, mandatory provision of air 
navigation facilities, etc. 
Bilateral agreements deal with the provision 
of air services between country pairs, the 
Convention having failed to achieve a 
multilateral framework for the sharing of the 
freedoms of the air. Bilateral agreements 
contain principles and rules not to be found 
in the Convention, most often more restric-
tive than the Convention itself: for instance, 
the clause that requires substantial owner-
ship and effective control of designated 
carriers to be in the hands of the designating 
state or of nationals of that state, (the so-
called "nationality clause"), the predetermi-
nation and apportionment of capacities to be 
provided on the agreed services, etc. 
The Chicago Convention operates on the 
principle of equal opportunities and leaves 
all countries free to choose the manner in 
which they will use those opportunities in 
the market place, provided the principles 
and rules of the Convention are observed. 
The Convention does not oppose multilat-
eral arrangements for the exchange of rights 
or the setting up of multinational operating 
agencies. On the contrary it contains provi-
sions to facilitate joint operating organisa-
tions and pooled services (Chapter XVI). 
Indeed the founding fathers of the Conven-
tion had in mind to reach one day a multilat-
eral air transport agreement (which some of 
them even tentatively signed in 1944, to-
gether with the Convention). 
The philosophy of the Convention is there-
fore compatible with a multilateral open 
regime of traffic rights, even though some 
clarification of the terms of the Convention 
may be helpful to apply it in the case of a 
regional arrangement of that nature. 
The main difficulties for international law 
arising from regulatory changes, such as 
those occurring on the European scene relate 
to bilateral agreements, many of which 
reflected over the years the increasingly 
directive, protectionist and competition 
restrictive policies followed by governments. 
Such agreements contain provisions now 
acknowledged as incompatible with the EU 
Single Aviation Market (such as the national-
ity clause for designation of airlines, manda-
tory commercial arrangements between 
designated carriers etc.). Member States are 
obliged, according to article 234 of the Rome 
Treaty, to take all appropriate steps to 
eliminate the incompatibilities. In other 
words, bilateral agreements must be renego-
tiated when necessary. 
The aviation landscape has changed radi-
cally with the globalisation of the economy 
and the maturity of the air transport indus-
try itself. Obviously, many countries, par-
ticularly in the developing world, still need some protection for their air transport 
industry and will, as they are free to do, 
retain their bilateral agreements. 
Others can enter into liberal arrangements 
under the umbrella of the Chicago Conven-
tion and revise their bilateral agreements to 
the extent necessary or simply render them 
irrelevant among themselves in a defined 
geographical area as the EC partners have 
done in 1992. The passage to multilateralism 
will not happen overnight, but a gradual 
transition may make a number of provisions 
in bilateral agreements either irrelevant or 
obsolete. 
A blueprint for global air transport does not 
exist at the moment. The Chicago Conven-
tion is hospitable enough to accomodate 
differing air transport agreements that are 
based on free participation, equity and 
common understanding. Statistics 
IDENTIFIABLE  DIFFERENCES  IN  COST  STRUCTURES 
OF  EUROPEAN  AND  US  SCHEDULED  AIRLINES 
CATEGORY  EUROPEAN/US AIRLINE DIFFERENCE 
Overall operating  European airline costs 21 cents/  ATK 
costs  or 45% higher than US 
DOCs 4 cents or 20% higher 
roes 17 cents or 65% higher 
TRENDS 
European unit costs 
increased by about 2% 
p.a. during 1988-92, 
US costs by 4% p.a. 
Labour and social  European costs 5.7 cents/  ATK or 3% higher  European costs per  ATK, 
costs  zero growth 1988-92, 
US grew by 3.5% 
REMARKS 
European cost disadvantage 
concentrated 
in passenger services, ticketing 
Average labour cost per employee 6% higher  and administration 
productivity 23% lower  European productivity 
grew by 5%, US by 1% 
Social charges now more of a 
Gross salary per employee 10% higher,  burden in US 
social costs 10% lower  European gross salaries have risen by 
5% p.a., US by about 3% p.a. 
European social charges have risen at 
under 4% p.a., US by over 10% p.a. 
Fuel costs and fuel- European costs 0.4 cents/  ATK or 6% higher  Same trend as in oil market but 
related charges  temporary differential of 
4 cents/  gallon developed between 
Per gallon costs up to 15% higher  Europe/US in 1991/92 
Airport charges  European charges 2.6 cents/  ATK 
or 3 times higher 
Costs per capacity-tonne 5 times higher 
Navigation charges  European charges 2.3 cents/  ATK 
or 10 times higher 
Source: Avnwrk 
Notes: Unit costs on a provisional 1992 basis 
Airport fees rising at roughly the 
same rate in both regions, 5% p.a. 
Double digit increases in same 
Eurocontrol countries 
No charges in US domestic market 
Generally consistent 
relationship between 
average national salaries 
and airline salaries 
Higher prices reduce benefit 
of Europe's more fuel efficient 
fleet 
High fuel-related charges 
in France, Germany and Italy 
International charges still apply 
for cross-border intra-EC flights 
Terminal navigation charges in 
US paid by passenger via 10% 
domestic ticket tax and 
international ticket taxes 
Immigration and customs 
charges paid by 
passengers via international 
ticket taxes in US 
En route charges in US are 
funded by passenger via 
10% domestic ticket tax 
and international ticket taxes Airline operating costs per ATK (1992 vs 1991) 
ATK  Average stage length  Total operating costs  Expenses per ATK  Monetary 
million  km  million$  cent  Fluctuation 
1991  1992  92/91  1991  1992  92/91  1991  1992  92/91  1991  1992  92/91  92/91 
British  Airways  12 925  14 636  +13.2% I  1 476  1 605  +8.7%  7 699  7 928  +3.0%  59.6  54.2  -9.1%  +2.5%  British  Airwavs 
Lufthansa  13 006  14 469  +11.3%  1 082  1 292  +  19.4%  9 224  9 977  +8.2%  70.9  69.0  -2.8%  +6.0%  Lufthansa 
Air France  10 376  12 038  +16.o% I  1 465  1 424  -2.8%  6 304  8 131  +29.0%  60.8  67.5  +11.2%  -6.4%  Air France 
KLM  6 767  7 999  +18.2% I  1911  1 919  +0.4%  3440  3 712  +7.9%  50.8  46.4  -8.7%  -7.4%  KLM 
Alitalia  4 539  5 216  +14.9%  1 117  1 134  +1.5%  3 629  3 828  +5.5%  80.0  73.4  -8.2%  -4.8%  Alitalia 
Iberia  4 673  4 951  +5.9%  1 103  1 103  +0.0%  3 329  3 630  +9.0%  71.2  73.3  +2.9%  +36.3%  Iberia 
Swissair  3 907  4 357  +  11.5%  1 177  1 233  +4.8%  3 391  3 544  +4.5%  86.8  81.3  -6.3%  -4.1%  Swissair 
SAS  3 074  3 180  +3.4%  783  784  +0.1%  3 391  3 748  +10.5%  110.3  117.9  +6.9%  -2.8%  SAS 
Virgin  1 739  1 869  +7.5%  7 085  7 085  +0.0%  550  693  +26.0%  31.6  37.1  +17.3%  +2.5%  Virgin 
Sabena  1 617  1 614  -0.2%  1 058  988  -6.6%  1 754  1 741  -0.8%  108.5  107.9  -0.6%  -5.8%  Sabena 
Finnair  1 589  1 539  -3.1%  1 087  1 084  -0.3%  902  820  -9.2%  56.8  53.3  -6.2%  +13.6%  Finnair 
TAP  1 376  1 474  +7.1% I  1 476  1 660  +12.5%  1 114  1 356  +21.7%  81.0  92.0  +13.6%  -8.0%  TAP 
Austrian  670  845  +26.2% I  980  1 102  +  12.4%  700  859  +22.7%  104.6  101.7  -2.8%  -5.3%  Austrian 
Aer Lingus  739  752  +1.9%  592  621  +4.9%  457  447  -2.3%  61.9  59.4  -4.1%  -3.6%  Aer Lin2:us 
British Midland  409  453  +10.8%  517  517  +0.0%  478  563  +17.9%  116.7  124.2  +6.4%  +2.5%  British Midland 
Total Europe  67 407  75 393  +11.8%  46 363  50 978  +10.0%  68.8  67.6  -1.7%  Total Europe 
American  25 921  30 297  +16.9%  1 730  1 842  +6.5%  12 081  13 658  +13.1%  46.6  45.1  -3.3%  American 
United  24 834  28 084  +13.1%  1 479  1 590  +7.5%  12 151  13 165  +8.3%  48.9  46.9  -4.2%  United 
Delta  21  738  26  192  +20.5%  1 105  1 207  +9.2%  10 329  12 465  +20.7%  47.5  47.6  +0.2%  Delta 
Continental  14 212  14 416  +1.4%  1 319  1 390  +5.4%  5 553  5 404  -2.7%  39.1  37.5  -4.1%  Continental 
US Air  10 893  11  355  +4.2%  798  848  +6.3%  6 251  6611  +5.8%  57.4  58.2  +1.5%  US Air 
I Southwest  3 523  4 088  +16.0%  603  616  +2.2%  1 252  1 503  +20.1%  35.5  36.8  +3.5%  Southwest 
Total US  101122 114 431  +13.2%  47 616  52 806  +10.9%  47.1  46.1  -2.0%  Total US 
Source: Avmark 
I  AIRLINE OPERATING COSTS PER ATK (1991) 
ATK  flight  laintenance  Depreciation  Total  Aiport  En-route  Handling  Passenger  Ticketing.  Other  Total  Total 
operations  and  and  direct  user  navigation  costs  services  sales  expenses  indirect  operating 
expenses  overhaul  amortisation  operating  charges  charges  exposures  and  operating  costs 
expenses  expenses  costs  promotion  costs 
(DOC)  expenses  (lOCI 
5 Bn  cent/ATK  cent/ATK  cent/ATK  cent/  ATK  cent/ ATK  ccnt/ATK  cent/ATK  cent/ATK  cent/ATK  cent/  ATK  cent/ATK  cent/  ATK 
Lufthansa  13.0  15.8  10.2  5.4  31.4  3.4  2.3  7.6  7.8  12.9  5.1  39.0  70.4  Lufthansa 
British  Airways  12.9  12.3  5.3  2.7  20.2  5.6  2.1  5.0  8.0  11.2  8.1  39.9  60.1  British  Airwavs 
Air France  10.4  14.5  5.3  5.0  24.7  2.8  1.4  6.9  6.7  8.2  9.8  35.8  60.5  Air France 
Iberia  4.7  17.3  6.9  4.7  28.9  3.0  2.2  7.9  9.0  17.1  2.1  41.4  70.3  Iberia 
Alitalia  4.5  16.8  10.3  4.8  31.9  2.6  2.6  10.9  10.3  13.7  8.5  48.4  80.4  Alitalia 
Swissair  3.9  17.5  12.7  6.7  36.9  3.4  2.6  13.1  11.4  16.8  2.3  49.7  86.5  Swissair 
SAS  3.0  23.1  13.0  4.5  40.6  9.6  3.1  15.0  6.5  20.9  15.8  71.0  111.6  SAS 
TAP  1.4  23.8  9.1  2.3  35.1  2.0  2.8  5.5  7.2  10.9  17.4  45.8  80.9  TAP 
Aer Lingus  0.7  17.3  13.3  5.4  36.0  11.5  3.7  12.7  11.8  13.9  6.4  59.9  95.9  Aer Lin2:us 
I 
Britannia  2.5  12.2  4.1  0.9  19.7  4.3  2.6  2.5  2.5  0.0  1.7  13.6  33.3  Britannia 
British Midland  0.4  23.4  7.2  2.9  34.0  17.8  5.6  5.8  13.0  10.51  6.4  59.1  93.2  British Midland 
Meridiana  0.2  28.3  10.7  8.8  48.0  4.4  3.4  19.3  9.3  13.7  10.2  60.3  108.3  Meridiana 
American  26.0  13.4  5.1  3.2  21.6  0.9  0.2  7.3  5.1  8.7  2.8  24.9  46.5  American 
United  24.8  14.2  6.1  2.6  22.8  0.9  0.2  6.0  5.4  12.4  4.2  29.0  51.8  United 
Delta  21.8  14.8  4.4  2.6  21.8  0.9  0.1  7.5  5.4  10.1  1.7  25.6  47.4  Delta 
Continental  14.2  11.9  5.2  1.3  18.4  0.8  0.2  4.9  3.6  6.7  3.9  20.1  38.5  Continental 
USAir  10.9  18.1  7.0  2.6  27.7  1.0  0.0  9.2  6.4  10.0  2.8  29.4  57.1  USAir 
Southwest  3.5  11.0  3.5  2.2  16.7  1.0  0.0  4.5  2.3  5.0  3.1  15.9  32.6  Southwest 
TAL  112.5  17.4  6.4  6.2  29.9  2.6  2.2  7.5  7.9  11.0  3.0  34.3  64.2  lAL 
Singapore  I  7.2  8.8  3.4  5.0  17.2  1.9  2.9  5.7  6.4  1.3  18.2  35.4  Sin2:aoore 
Oantas  I  5.8  14.7  4.9  2.4  22.0  1.2  1.2  4.9  5.3  8.2  2.0  22.9  44.9  Oantas 
'  ,,,  ..  Source.  Avmark Profitability of AEA airlines 
us$ 000  1990  1991  1992 
Net result  Turnover  Net result  Turnover  Net result  Turnover  I 
AerLimms  8 300  1 235 500  -18 500  1 351  900  -195 600  1 381  000 
Air France  -132 100  10 465 900  -121 416  10 196 200  -617 000  10 769 400 
Air Malta 
Alitalia  -81 700  4 592 000  -27 900  4 750 400  -11  900  5 510 700 
Austrian  11  500  817 700  11200  847 400  100  1 003 800 
Balkan 
BA  169 600  8 812 900  687 300  9 090 000  297 700  9 307 700 
CSA  44700  294 000 
Cyprus 
Fin  nair  -18 800  1 463 900  -13 200  1 285 000  -16 800  1132 200 
Iberia  -137 700  3 695 300  -346 800  3 706 300  -339 800  4136 700 
Icelandair 
TAT  -46 500  545 400  -104 900  412 600 
KLM  -346 900  3 609 000  66200  4 189 000  -319000  4 666 300 
Lufthansa  9400  8 962 800  -257 700  9 746 100  -250 400  11  036 500 
Luxair  600  252 600 
Malev  10400  267 000  16100  298 000  300  338 600 
Olympic  -164 300  940 900  -133 900  828 500  -224 800  922 500 
Sabena  -205 700  1 065 200  -68 600  1 533 200  11  700  1 708 300 
SAS  -144 800  5 331  600  -239 000  5 806 800  -127 400  5 908 200 
Swissair  -15 900  3 778 600  57900  4 146 200  80 700  4 438 500 
TAP  -15 300  860 500  -38 000  1 041  000  -199 800  1 110 100 
THY  -20 900  653 900  -156 400  511  100  -87 300  736 500 
-1  076 700  57 392 100  -687 616  59 739 700  -1  998 700  64359 600 
-1.88%  -1.15%  -3.11% 
Source: Airline Business, ICAO 
Labour productivity of individual air carriers 
Carrier  ATK per employee  Productivity increase 
(1992)  1988-1992 
Europe 
Aer Lingus  144,136  7.76% 
Air France  289,170  1.52% 
Alitalia  279,617  7.64% 
British Airways  298,939  6.91% 
Iberia  172,244  5.18% 
KLM  325,635  6.41% 
Lufthansa  291,196  2.92% 
SAS  172,650  6.69% 
Swissair  220,204  4.89% 
TAP  132,557  3.11% 
us 
American  332,256  2.38% 
Continental  412,181  -2.37% 
Delta  330,888  2.76% 
United  357,454  2.20% 
US  Air  248,505  1.23% 
Southwest  372,482  5,21% 
Source: Avmark The Comite's Working  Programme 
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October 1 1993 
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October 5 1993 
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Intra-European Affairs: 
October 8 1993 
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October 11  1993 
Harmonisation: 
October 18 1993 
Industry  hearings 
September 9 1993 (16 presentations) 
September 16 1993 (12 presentations) 
Press  conferences 
July 13 1993 
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Presentation  of  the  Chairman 
to  the  Council  of Ministers 
November 30 1993 
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the  49th lATA  Annual  General 
Meeting 
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- Eric Kirsch, Administrateur General, 
RLW-RVA Belgium, August 9 1993 
- Sir Colin Marshall, Chairman, 
British Airways, August 11 
- Rene Lapautre, former UTA Chairman, 
August 19 1993 
- Baudouin Gillis, Administrateur-delegue, 
Wagons-lits Travel, September 1 1993 
- Abel Matutes, Member of the European 
Commission, September 20 1993 
- Robert L. Crandall, Chairman and 
President, American Airlines, 
September 22 1993 
- Secretary Federico Pena, US Department 
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- Pierre Godfroid, Chairman, Sabena, 
October 14 1993 
- Abel Matutes, Member of the European 
Commission, November 24 1993 
- Karel Van Miert, Vice President of the 
European Commission, November 25 1993 
- Jacques Broquin, President, Federation 
Internationale des Cadres des Transports 
(FICT), Paris, December 2 1993 
Washington  mission 
July 231993 
The Chairman, Herman De Croo, 
was accompanied by: 
Geoffrey Lipman, Guillermo Serrano, 
Eckard Seebohm 
Meetings were held with: 
James E.  Landry, Air Transport Association 
Nat Wilson, Air Transport Association 
Gerald L. Baliles, Chairman of The National 
Commission to Ensure a Strong Competi-
tive Airline Industry 
John H. Robson, Member of the International 
Issues team 
Abraham D. Sofaer, Chairman of the Inter-
national Issues team 
Gina F. Thomas, Member of the Commission 
Sylvia A. de Leon, Member of the Commis-
sion 
Capt. J.  Randolph Babbit, Member of the 
Commission 
James Oberstar, Chairman of the Aviation 
Subcommittee of the House of Representa-
tives "  . 
~' 
Members of the Comite 
Herman De Croo, Chairman, Senator, 
former Belgian Minister of  Transport 
His Highness The Aga Khan, Majority 
Shareholder of  Meridiana 
Pieter Bouw, President of KLM Royal 
Dutch Airlines 
Bjarne Hansen, President ofMaersk Air 
Geoffrey Lipman, President of  the World 
Travel & Tourism Council 
Henri Martre, Member of the Board and 
former Executive Chairman of Aerospa-
tiale 
Joao-Maria Oliveira-Martins, former 
Portuguese Minister of Transport 
Gonzalo Pascual, Chairman of  Spanair 
Manfred Scholch, Vice Chairman of the 
Executive Board of  Frankfurt Airport 
Guillermo Serrano, Chairman of the 
Board of Amadeus 
Rene Valladon, Chairman of  the Joint 
Civil Aviation Council (Union «Force 
Ouvriere") 
Jiirgen Weber, Chairman of the Executive 
Board of  Lufthansa German Airlines 
Observer 
of  the  European  Commission 
Daniel Vincent, Director, Directorate-
General for Transport 
The staff 
Secretariat 
The European Aviation Club ASBL 
Prof. Jacques Naveau, Brussels 
University, Chairman 
Andre Clodong, Director 
Sylvie De Schryvere, Assistant 
Advisory  support  and  liaison  with 
the  European  Commission 
Eckard Seebohm, Principal 
Administrator, Directorate-General of 
Transport, Air Transport Policy Unit, 
European Commission 
Christopher Ross, Directorate-General of 
Transport, Air Transport Policy Unit, 
European Commission GLOSSARY 
ACE 
Association des Compagnies Aeriennes de la 
Communaute Europeenne 
AEA 
Association of European Airlines 
APATSI 
Airport/  Air Traffic Systems Interface 
ASK 
Available Seat Kilometres. The number of seats 
made available for sale multiplied by the distance 
flown 
ATC 
Air Traffic Control 
ATK 
Available Tonne Kilometres. The number of 
tonnes of capacity available for the carriage of 
revenue load (passengers and cargo) multiplied 
by the distance flown 
Bilateral Air Transport Agreement 
Agreement that regulates air services between 
two countries 
Cabotage 
The carriage of traffic between two airports 
which are located within one country 
Capacity 
In relation to aircraft: the payload of an aircraft 
available. In relation to air services: the capacity 
of the aircraft used on such services, multiplied 
by the frequency over a given period on the air 
routes considered 
Chapter 3 
ICAO noise standard 
Chapter 11 
Provisions of the US bankruptcy law that set out 
conditions under which entreprises in default 
may continue their activities while restructuring 
CNS/ATM 
Communications, Navigation and Surveillance/ 
Air Traffic Management (formerly FANS) 
Code Sharing 
An agreement between two airlines to use the 
designation code of one airline on a flight 
operated by the other airline 
Coordinated Airport 
An airport where a coordinator has been ap-
pointed to facilitate the operations of air carriers 
operating or intending to operate at that airport, 
as per EC Council Regulation 95/93 
Fully Coordinated Airport 
A coordinated airport where, in order to land or 
take off during the periods for which it is fully 
coordinated, it is necessary for an air carrier to 
have a slot allocated by a coordinator, as per EC 
Council Regulation 95/93 
CRS 
Computer Reservation Systems 
EAT CHIP 
European Air Traffic Control Harmonisation and 
Integration Programme 
ECAC 
European Civil Aviation Conference 
Eurocontrol 
European Organisation for the Safety of Air 
Navigation 
FANS 
Future Air Navigation System (now CNS/  ATM) 
FFP 
Frequent Flyer Programme 
lATA 
International Air Transport Association 
ICAO 
International Civil Aviation Organization 
Interlining 
Acceptance by an air carrier of traffic documents 
(tickets, airwaybills, etc.) issued by another, 
without additional charge to the passenger or the 
shipper; normally on a reciprocal basis through 
agreements providing also for uniform proce-
dures of reservation, re-routing etc. 
JAA 
Joint Aviation Authorities. Set up by ECAC 
to harmonise air transport regulations and 
standards 
Load factor 
The percentage relationship of revenue load 
carried to capacity provided. The overall load 
factor relates RTK to ATK. The passenger load 
factor relates RPK to ASK 
Overcapacity 
Offer (available payload) structurally in excess of 
demand (cfr.:  capacity) 
RPK 
Revenue Passenger Kilometres. The number of 
revenue passengers carried multiplied by the 
distance flown 
RTK 
Revenue Tonne Kilometres. The revenue load 
(passengers and cargo) in tonnes multiplied by 
the the distance flown 
Slot 
The scheduled time of arrival or departure 
available or allocated for an aircraft movement 
on a specific date at an airport 
TKP 
Tonne Kilometers Performed 
Trans European Networks (TEN) 
According to the Treaty on European Union 
(Title-XII), infrastructure networks shall be 
established and developed in the areas of trans-
port, telecommunications and energy. The main 
objective of TEN will be interoperability of 
national networks, linkage between central, 
island landlocked and peripheral regions of the 
European Union, as well as ensuring interconnec-
tions with Third-Countries. These networks will 
be financed by Member States budgets, private 
resources and European Union financial instru-
ments. The Commission's White Paper (Brussels, 
December 1993) emphasises the priority to be 
given to TEN in restoring growth, competitive-
ness and employment in Europe. 
Note: the submissions received by the Comite 
have been compiled in an annexe to the Report of 
the Comite. This annexe is available from the 
Directorate-General of Transport, European 
Commission 
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